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THE RESILIENCE OF PROPERTY
Lynda L. Butler*

Resilience is essential to the ability of property to face transforming social and
environmental change. For centuries, property has responded to such change
through a dialectical process that identifies emerging disciplinary perspectives
and debates conflicting values and norms. This dialectic promotes the resilience of
property, allowing it to adapt to changing conditions and needs. Today the
mainstream economic theory dominating common law property is progressively
being intertwined with constitutionally protected property, undermining its longterm resilience. The coupling of the economic vision of ordinary property with
constitutional property embeds the assumptions, choices, and values of the
economic theory into both realms of property without regard for property’s other
relational planes.
A real-life theory of property—one based on a theory–practice link—sees the
property landscape as a function of interactions among possible property
arrangements and other perspective-based systems, including natural systems.
Understanding property as a function of those relational planes is important to
preserving its resilience. Research on the dynamics of change in social–ecological
systems provides important insight into how institutions, like property, that
manage resources can promote resilience. The mainstream economic theory lacks
the openness and interdisciplinary inclusion needed to handle complex
disturbances, ignoring conflicting perspectives and alternative visions that have
played a significant role in the evolution of property. Often presented as involving
either/or choices, the mainstream theory takes a singular perspective that
overlooks important dialectical interactions. As subsystems of larger natural
systems, complex societies need a resilient property system open to different
perspectives and new knowledge if they are to handle the serious challenges of the
future.
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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, a growing number of property owners began to resist
the increasingly restrictive regulations governing the use of their property.
Sometimes the resistance involved forming advocacy groups to advance the cause
of property rights through the media or through lobbying efforts aimed at state and
federal legislators. Other times the resistance revolved around challenges in court
on constitutional and other grounds. The initial focus of the resistance was
environmental law, particularly protections for wetlands and endangered species.
As property owners and property rights groups won some impressive victories,
challenges to traditional zoning regulations became more commonplace.1 At the
core of the resistance was the claim that government laws were illegitimately and

1.
Michelle K. Walsh, Note, Achieving the Proper Balance Between the Public
and Private Property Interests: Closely Tailored Legislation as a Remedy, 19 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 321 (1995); H. Jane Lehman, Private Property Rights
Proponents Gain Ground, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at E1.
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unnecessarily infringing on constitutionally protected property rights—rights that
are inseparably linked to liberty and freedom under the U.S. Constitution.2
The fight being waged by the property rights movement against
environmental laws specifically, and government regulation more generally, is
largely a grassroots effort. All of a sudden, environmentalists—who, for years,
have used grassroots tactics to advance their cause—are facing serious challenges
from another emerging grassroots movement: the property rights activists. 3 In
addition to thwarting congressional proposals supported by environmentalists, 4 the
movement has backed litigation resulting in decisions favorable to property
owners5 and has successfully pushed pro-property rights legislation through a
number of states.6 More recently, the movement has turned its sights on
government efforts to deal with climate change and its impacts, challenging the
2.
See, e.g., An Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1998: Hearing on S. 2373 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Nancie Marzulla, President, Defenders of Property Rights). A significant part
of the resistance arose in western states having significant federally owned public lands.
Along with private property supporters, those state governments claimed that the federal
government had improperly and illegally retained title to public lands within the state
instead of distributing them to private parties. The states also argued that wise use and
control by private landowners would provide more effective environmental management.
See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968)
(discussing, in a landmark study, the history of acquisition of public lands and the
development of public land law); ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2012) (reviewing our system
of federal land management as well as current issues).
3.
As the movement has gained strength and prominence, though, it has become
clear that wealthy landowners and corporations are contributing to the movement’s cause.
See, e.g., Keith Hammond, Wingnuts in Sheep’s Clothing, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 4, 1997,
1:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1997/12/wingnuts-sheeps-clothing (listing
the corporate funders of several property rights groups opposing environmental regulations).
4.
See, e.g., Susan Eckles, Interior Department: The Good, Bad, and Very Ugly,
OFF-ROAD.COM (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.off-road.com/trails-events/voice/interiordepartment-the-good-bad-and-very-ugly-16256.html (advising readers of the nominees
supported by the American Land Rights Association for the Secretary of the Interior
position); Press Release, Pacific Legal Foundation, PLF Petitions Feds to End ESA Listing
of the Orca in the Pacific Northwest (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.pacificlegal.org/releases/PL
F-petitions-feds-to-end-ESA-listing-of-the-Orca-in-the-Pacific-Northwest.
5.
See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369–71, 1374 (2012) (ruling that
designating property as wetland was a final agency action, entitling a property owner to
judicial review); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742–43 (2006) (limiting the
bodies of water able to be regulated as wetlands under the Clean Water Act); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001) (ruling that acquisition of property title after the
effective date of regulations limiting use of land did not bar takings suit); Schooner Harbor
Ventures, Inc. v. United States, 569 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiff
in a takings suit had alleged a cognizable property interest when challenging mitigation
measures requested under the Endangered Species Act).
6.
See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and
Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 707–08
(2011).
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conclusions of climate change scientists, questioning the legitimacy of federal
regulation of greenhouse gases, and lobbying to allow oil and gas companies to
drill without meeting standard disclosure obligations. 7
How has the property rights movement been able to emerge so rapidly to
a position of influence and begin to change property’s constitutional landscape?
The movement has gathered its strength, much as the environmental movement
did, from the “power of its stories.”8 The property rights movement may not have a
figurehead as well known or prominent as Rachel Carson of the environmental
movement, but it does have some powerful stories to tell—stories that reveal the
outrage felt by its supporters and that immediately create a sympathetic audience.
Consider, for example, the “horror story” told by Representative Billy
Tauzin when he discussed the impact of the Endangered Species Act on some
California landowners.9 The tension between the Act and the landowners came to a
head in the early 1990s during the California brush fires. “Many people watched in
dismay as their homes burned down because they were not allowed to dig around
them and create fire breaks. Why? Because the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
summarily and arbitrarily determined that such precautions would disturb the
habitat of the kangaroo rat.”10 Protection of a rat trumped the protection of homes.
Other powerful stories have also been told. One tells the plight of a
Maryland couple who were prohibited from preventing erosion on their property
because the action might destroy the tiger beetles present on their land. 11 Because
they could not act, “‘a fifteen-foot section of their property plunged into the bay.
Their home . . . [thus became] the endangered species.’”12 Another explains how
hundreds of millions of dollars of Southern California construction projects,
including a hospital, were held up by a tiny, endangered fly. 13 The only known
7.
See Brief for Respondents Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n,
Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Truck Mfrs. Ass’n at 9–13, 19–24, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120); Mike Soraghan, Frack Study’s Safety Findings
Exaggerated, Bush EPA Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.co
m/gwire/2011/05/20/20greenwire-frack-studys-safety-findings-exaggerated-bush-65374.
html. Much of the resistance to climate change solutions has its roots in the fear of a global
government. To this day, some Americans believe that Agenda 21––the UN’s Programme
of Action for Sustainable Development adopted in 1992––represents a plan to subject the
United States to a global ruling body. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, Top Georgia GOP Lawmakers
Host Briefing on Secret Obama Mind-Control Plot, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:11
PM), www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/11/georgia-senate-gets-52-minute-briefing-unitednations-takeover; see also Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics,
HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 1964, at 77 (discussing the impact that a small minority with an
angry, suspicious mindset can have on the nation).
8.
William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1158 (1997).
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 1159.
12.
Id.
13.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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breeding grounds of this fly are the sand dunes in the desert east of Los Angeles.14
Private parties owned most of the dunes and found their development projects
halted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service because of the fly’s placement on the
endangered species list.15 At the time, the market value of the land in the region
was as much as $100,000 an acre.16
Until 2005, the stories being told by property rights activists were not
common knowledge. Then the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Kelo
v. City of New London,17 holding that the City’s economic development project
promoted a public use as required under the Takings Clause of the federal
Constitution. The Court explained that the project served a public purpose—and
was not simply a transfer from one private party to another—because the economic
development resulted from comprehensive planning; did not, from the onset, target
a particular private party to be benefitted; and did not involve the conveyance of
condemned property to only a few private parties. This decision galvanized the
property rights movement, finally enabling it to transcend local and regional news
stories and influence legislative bodies at all levels of government. 18 The image of
Suzanne Kelo’s tidy pink house has become a rallying cry for the movement. 19
The powerful narratives told by private property rights advocates have a
number of common features. In each of the narratives, the affected property owner
is not engaging in a noxious or harmful use, but rather is simply trying to conduct
an ordinary and productive use. Further, because of government action, each
landowner endures devastating loss. The narratives immediately convey a sense of
unfairness, injustice, and individual hardship. 20 These feelings are often so intense
that they sometimes hide a third common feature of the narratives: the promotion
of a view of property that gives preeminence to the individual right holder over
government and the public. That view stresses the importance of individual
autonomy and seeks to limit the government’s power to restrict the freedoms
reflected in the private property concept. Government action that seriously restricts
property rights, significantly diminishes their value, or adversely affects economic

14.
See id.
15.
See Lynda Gorov, Protecting a Fly May Endanger Calif. Towns, BOS.
GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1999, at A1.
16.
Endangered Fly Stalls Some California Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002,
at 40; Gorov, supra note 15. For further narratives, see Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the
Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 637 (1995).
17.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
18.
See, e.g., Tim Hearden, Feds Consider De-listing Valley Elderberry
Longhorn Beetle, CAPITAL PRESS, http://www.capitalpress.com/content/TH-velb-w-infobox100312 (last updated Nov. 1, 2012) (discussing how a legal group with a focus on property
rights has influenced federal endangered species listing decisions).
19.
Family Water Alliance, The Kelo Curse, GREEN RIBBON REPORTS (Fall
2009), http://www.familywateralliance.com/farm_fall_09_kelo_curse.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2013).
20.
Treanor, supra note 8, at 1161–62.
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expectations generally is viewed as illegitimate. Over time, these popular
narratives have even become part of judicial narratives in takings disputes.21
Although the narratives admittedly highlight some situations where
government has gone too far in regulating property, the stories exaggerate the
problem of excessive government regulation in a way that could distort the
development of property law. In addition to denying the legitimacy of important
environmental laws and public interests, many property rights advocates are
ignoring alternative and competing visions of property that have impacted the
development of constitutional and common law property. 22 Along with the vision
of property supported by property rights advocates, these overlooked alternative
visions of property have played an important role in the property debate,
interacting with one another over time through political, legal, and social processes
to define and refine property rights in response to changing conditions, interests,
and knowledge. In their desire to ensure the dominance and sole legitimacy of their
vision of property, property rights advocates have failed to recognize not only the
organic nature of property, but also the give-and-take process by which property
law develops. They have failed to recognize that property is an evolving institution
that engages multiple values and norms vetted through a dialectical process23
involving political, moral, economic, scientific, social, and legal perspectives.
In that dialectical process, competing norms and values interact with one
another, both at the margin and at the core, in political, economic, social, and legal
forums, challenging existing approaches, informing the thinking on property, and
sometimes evolving into new property rules, standards, and arrangements. These
interactions are tempered and guided, at least in part, by the sense of order found
in the rule of law, in the informal norms and practices of close-knit communities,
and in the understandings brought by new knowledge. 24 Eventually, when tensions
between formal rules and informal norms, customs, or conditions reveal one or
more to be obsolete or irrational, legislative or judicial action changes them.
Though one ideology may dominate the conception of property at any point in
time, eventually other ideologies erode the support for the dominant view by
targeting the weaknesses of the dominant perspective. Property rights have never
been locked in time or thought, not even in the days of the founding fathers. To the
contrary, the property conception has reflected resilience and fluidity at the
margin, and relative stability at the core. This quality of stable dynamism is
21.
For a discussion of some of these narratives, see Gregory S. Alexander,
Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1988).
22.
Perhaps the best evidence of this danger of distortion can be found in the
Court’s plurality opinion of Stop the Beach Renourishment. See infra notes 309–14 and
accompanying text.
23.
See infra Part III for further discussion of this dialectical process.
24.
See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315
(1993) (discussing the evolution of land regimes over time and explaining how close-knit
groups use customary norms and rules to develop their regime). For an insightful essay
offering a theory of change in collective behavior along the public–private dimension, see
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION
(1982).

2013]

RESILIENCE OF PROPERTY

853

possible because of the deliberative, dialectical process traditionally used to define
property rights, choose property regimes, and change property arrangements. If
one vision of property were to control, the dialectical process shaping property
would cease to function, and property would become a static institution. Property
would lose its resilience.
This Article examines the movement to elevate the individual rights
vision of property—driven and informed in large part by mainstream economics—
to a controlling and determinative position. After highlighting key visions of
property influencing property law, the Article examines how the individual rights
vision is being elevated to a position of supremacy through constitutional
principles and discusses the importance of decoupling property rights from a single
vision. This movement is troubling because it ignores alternative visions of
property that have served important roles in the property debate. The movement
also does not account for the dialectical process that guides the evolution of
property rights, values, and norms. That process serves important checking and
corrective functions, ensuring that no single view acquires monopoly status and
that changes are made as problems arise, weaknesses become apparent, or
conditions change. The movement also ignores the role of informal norms in
encouraging cooperation among property owners and fails to recognize the
importance of the resilience of property to its ability to evolve.

I. COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY: DEFINING PROPERTY’S
RELATIONAL LANDSCAPE
Debate over the idea of property—its conceptual meaning and its
normative justifications—has occupied the minds of scholars for centuries. Some
scholars advocate for a comprehensive, monistic theory of property, defining
property rights in terms of one core norm or foundational principle from which all
second principles, standards, and rules flow. 25 Others see property as a collection
of interests that may vary according to the circumstances but that otherwise gives
the holder certain rights and powers. 26 Still others view property as a concept with
a well-developed structure based on some defining feature. 27 A number of
conceptions define property as a multidimensional idea that provides
protective powers in various settings28 or that promotes a pluralistic set of

25.
See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–22
(1977); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3–9, 172–75 (3d ed. 2008).
26.
See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS
XXII 69, 69–71 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); J.E. Penner, The
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 711–24 (1996).
27.
See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 275–79 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude,
77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730–31, 740–52 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–61 (1982).
28.
See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND
POWER 1–8, 37–51 (2003).
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values.29 Through all of these theories, scholars debate the foundational norms,
defining features, key functions, and competing visions of property.
In modern times, mainstream economics has dominated this debate. The
economic theory of property focuses on the individual property owner’s right to
use, manage, control, and exploit his or her property. Property rights in resources
are recognized, under mainstream economic theory, when such recognition would
promote efficiency and maximize social utility. 30 Though adherents of mainstream
economics debate when that point is reached, they generally agree that resources
subject to property rights become assets or commodities to be used, developed, and
exploited through marketplace transactions for personal profit. 31
For a number of reasons, this mainstream economic vision of property is
slowly being constitutionalized. Constitutional property is now taking on a
meaning that could fundamentally change the institution of property. This
movement to give the economic vision constitutional dominance is ignoring the
role that alternative visions of property have played in the development of property
and of society more generally. It is ignoring, in other words, the resilience and
evolution of property—how its norms, customs, and practices acquire legal
legitimacy and change over time. 32
Because property rights exist in a resource—often a natural resource,
interactions between property systems and natural systems play an important role
in framing the debate over the proper vision of property. Key relationships that
affect the nature of the interactions include the relationship between a property
owner and the community (often represented by a political or government entity)
and the relationship between the property owner and natural systems. 33 Two
continua can be used to reflect the different views of property that result from
29.
See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1411–13, 1437–45 (2012). See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER &
EDUARDO S. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY Pt. I (2012) (discussing
various property theories).
30.
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 347–48, 350–53 (1967); James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of
Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 142 (2009); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of
Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93,
93–94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
31.
See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970 (1997)
(discussing the development of the commodification view of property and its dialectic with
the civic republican view). For further discussion of the debate among economists, see infra
Part II.A.
32.
For further discussion of the meaning of “evolution of property,” see Krier,
supra note 30; Rose, supra note 30.
33.
Though other relationships also have affected the development of property,
see infra Part III, the concept of property is, at its core, about “the interface between
individual and collective entitlements.” Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights
in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. COMMONS 9, 17 (2011). For further discussion of the significance
of the second relational dimension and the interface between property owners and natural
systems, see infra Part III.
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defining those relationships. One addresses the extent to which private rights
trump community interests or public goods, while the other focuses on the degree
to which human interests drive resource use and management decisions.
The private rights–public good continuum includes a wide range of
views. At one end are those who believe in the primacy of the individual and
private property rights over government or community interests. Individualism and
autonomy are important values in this camp. On the other end are those who
believe that property rights are created by government, held subject to the public
good, and include a social or civic obligation. Although private property rights still
are respected, followers of this view basically believe that property rights can and
should be modified by government to promote important public interests, however
those are defined.
The human–natural systems continuum contains views ranging from
purely homocentric visions of property rights and resource use to ecological or
green perspectives. Homocentric perspectives regard humans as the dominant
species entitled to control allocation and use of natural resources. Ecologically
oriented views recognize the value and importance of nonhuman interests,
incorporating natural values into decisionmaking. At the extreme, these ecological
views even label humans as “interlopers” and give priority to ecological interests
over human interests.34 This continuum captures the degree to which one is willing
to accommodate preferences for property owners and humans over preferences for
natural systems.
Parts I.A and I.B discuss these two relational continua in greater detail.
As each continuum is explored, some important issues and lessons about the
evolution of property will emerge. Part I.C then examines the relationship between
the two continua, asking whether that relationship involves truly dichotomous and
exclusive visions or instead dialectical interactions defining property’s relational
plane with nature. The choice matters a lot in answering the questions: How does
property evolve? Will it continue to do so in the future?
A. The Private Rights–Public Goods Continuum
Some of the tensions existing between the two continua, and within the
private rights–public goods continuum in particular, are beautifully highlighted by
Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall.35 The poem describes the sometimes futile
lengths to which property owners go to separate their property from the rest of the
world—futile because basic questions are not asked and important interactions are
not considered, causing many of these efforts to fail over time. Landowners rarely
ask, for example, what they are “walling in or walling out.” Nor do they ask, as
Frost does, whether fences make good neighbors or instead “give offence,” serving
no useful purpose at all.36 Fences and other boundaries, in other words, try to
34.
JANE JACOBS, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIES ix (2000).
35.
ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in COLLECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 47–
48 (Henry Holt & Co. 1930).
36.
Among other questions, Frost asks:
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bound what is boundless,37 despite the constant need to mend (or amend)
boundaries due to external forces and interests, all in an effort to proclaim through
physical structures the message of individual dominion and control. The fences
symbolize property’s sometimes misplaced effort to separate the owner from the
rest of the world.
As Frost’s poem hints, the ends of the private rights–public goods
continuum reflect a fundamental debate over the appropriate balance between
private entitlements and collective or third-party interests. Sections A.1 and A.2
examine both ends of this continuum. In addition to defining each end-state ideal,
the discussion explores the implications of both ideals for constitutional and
common law property.
1. The Private or Individual Rights Vision of Property
The individual rights vision of property generally is based on the notion
that individual property owners should, as a matter of political and economic
thinking, have the right to control the resources that they own. Under this vision,
tangible natural resources are separated into discrete categories or parcels for
purposes of ownership, management, and use, and the private owners of these
resources owe little to society other than to avoid harming others. 38 Proponents of
the individual rights vision disagree, though, on the weight that they attach to the
core values of individualism and autonomy underlying the vision. 39 Some attach
importance to both individualism and autonomy, coupling the two values with
economic or political theory in ways that strengthen individual property rights. 40
Others stress the importance of individual growth over the importance of
autonomy and take a more moderate view of individual rights, recognizing the
need for greater accountability for negative spillovers caused by individual
property owners.
Why do they make good neighbors? Isn’t it
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.
Id.
37.
See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON
ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 5–6 (2007).

PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND

38.
See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of
Property, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 259, 262 (1992).
39.
One of the best examples of property’s separateness is the division and
subdivision of land into “discrete parcels separated by rigid boundary lines.” Stewart E.
Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987). This geometricbox approach to allocation of land rights meshes well with “a society whose members
highly value individualism and autonomy.” Id. at 90.
40.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 379; see also Lynda L. Butler, The
Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature’s Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927,
938 (2000).
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Under the more extreme approach to the individual rights vision,
proponents maintain that property owners should have near-absolute dominion and
control over their property as against government and the rest of the world.41 They
believe that the primary—if not sole—purpose of government is to protect private
property against harmful interference from governmental or private action. 42 To a
“strict libertarian,” property’s primary function is to maximize the economic and
political freedom of the property owner,43 even when the promotion of that
function conflicts with community needs. 44 The libertarian’s property conception
defines “in material terms the legal and political sphere within which individuals
are free to pursue their own private agendas and satisfy their own preferences, free
from governmental coercion or other forms of external interference.” 45
Supporters of the strict libertarian view of property would read broadly
the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution to protect private property from most
government action that significantly restricts property rights without payment of
just compensation. Under such a libertarian view, most of the surplus from
cooperative efforts would be preserved for property owners.46 Only when the
landowner is engaging in a use that is clearly recognized as harmful to neighbors
under objective readings of state common law would uncompensated regulation of
the landowner’s property rights be permitted. 47 A strict libertarian interpretation of
the Clause would limit, for example, government’s ability to regulate property in
ways that significantly diminish or eliminate economically viable use absent a
showing of an actual unlawful or harmful use by a regulated landowner or of
preexisting limitations on the property owner’s title.48 The strict libertarian view
similarly would invalidate laws that prevented the alteration of privately owned
land containing important wildlife habitats or environmentally sensitive resources
unless the landowner’s use was a nuisance or unless preexisting limitations on the
landowner’s title existed.
A strict libertarian approach thus would narrowly define the police power
bases supporting regulation without compensation, looking primarily to traditional
common law principles of property and nuisance. Yet those traditional principles
generally do not address problems that modern science now understands are
caused by alteration of environmentally sensitive resources or destruction of
ecosystem services. Private nuisance law requires proof of substantial interference
41.
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *2; ERIC T. FREYFOGLE,
BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS: ENVISIONING A NEW LAND ETHIC 98 (1998).
42.
See Alexander, supra note 38, at 264–65.
43.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 3–7; JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF
PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP 29–31 (1994); ELY, supra
note 25, at 172–75.
44.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 334–35 (1985).
45.
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 1; see also Butler, supra note 40, at 995.
46.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 334–35.
47.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); see also
EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 112–21.
48.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
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with the use and enjoyment of someone’s property; such proof would be hard to
establish when a landowner is simply altering resources on her own tract of land in
a way that diminishes critical habitats or ecosystem services gradually over time or
cumulatively in combination with similar changes on other tracts. 49 The interests
of neighboring landowners in the ecosystem services of those environmental
resources simply would not rise to the level of a superior, protected interest under
traditional common law nuisance. Further, although public nuisance law arguably
has sufficient breadth of coverage to include air and water pollution, 50 the public
nuisance cause of action generally has not been extended to habitat, species, or
wetlands destruction.51 Nor do traditional public rights theories provide sufficient
justification, under the strict libertarian approach, for uncompensated regulation of
private property to preserve critical environmental resources or ecosystem
services. Most traditional public rights theories focus on affirmative public use of
common resources (like navigable waters, adjacent shores, and submerged beds), 52
49.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50–73 (1979) (explaining traditional principles
governing liability for private nuisance).
50.
See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 114–15 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing the broad scope of air and water pollution laws).
51.
See 1 ENVTL. LAW INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 5:29 (Scott
E. Schang et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the idea of using public nuisance to protect
ecological resources). Before public nuisance liability can be imposed on the offending
landowner, an individual plaintiff typically has to prove special harm attributable to the
unreasonable conduct of the landowner, while the government has to establish interference
with a right common to the public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979);
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.2 (2d ed. 1993). See generally
Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011)
(discussing the mismatch between our private property system and environmental problems
such as endangered species, biodiversity, and wetlands destruction).
52.
Two key traditional public rights theories are the public trust doctrine and the
commons concept. See generally LYNDA LEE BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA
TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW chs. 5, 6 (1988) (discussing both theories); Robin Kundis Craig,
A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classification of States,
Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin
Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 53 (2010). Traditional interpretation of those theories arguably would include
affirmative uses of the public trust resource (such as navigation and fishing) but not more
passive forms to prevent injury (such as harm to ecosystem services occurring from uses on
private land). See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (recognizing
navigation and commerce related uses); Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E.
689, 693 (1932) (refusing to apply the public trust doctrine to block the dumping of
untreated sewage into a navigable waterway); BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra, at 130–31,
142–47. Several scholars have advanced forceful cases for broadening the meaning and
interpretation of the traditional theories. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711
(1986) (arguing persuasively for treating some natural resources as inherently public
property); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (providing a powerful argument for
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and would not, as a general matter, impose preexisting limitations on landowners
seeking to alter critical habitats or otherwise diminish ecosystem services. Thus,
because the strict view narrowly defines the police power justifications for
government regulation without payment of just compensation, uncompensated
government regulation of privately owned land for the purpose of preserving the
land’s environmental resources or ecosystem services would be in jeopardy under
the Takings Clause.
Such government regulation of private property could, of course, occur
with the payment of just compensation, assuming the government action is
otherwise legitimate. Governments promoting more passive environmental
interests, however, often lack the financial resources to pay private property
owners for the adverse effect of regulations designed to protect ecosystem services
for all. Even though the aggregate benefits of the program might be high, the
interests of those benefitted by the program typically are too diffused, too small on
an individual basis, or too difficult to value to make the case for using taxpayer
funds obvious. The absence of an affirmative use creating the type of value that
markets appreciate further aggravates the problem of government’s limited ability
to pay and of selling the program to taxpayers. In times of financial distress,
governments can face large budget cuts, slumping economies, and a general lack
of political will to raise taxes. The assumption of trickle-down economics does not
fit the realities of such a situation. Thus, government may opt not to regulate if the
strict libertarian approach was taken and compensation was required, not even to
handle serious problems involving significant cumulative harms or serious adverse
effects not easily observed or measured at a given point in time. Though an
inability to pay should not be an excuse for avoiding constitutional obligations, it
may be relevant to determining whether such an obligation actually exists or to
choosing among different theories of constitutionally protected property. It also
may be relevant to defining the proper scope of property rights when important
common resources are being harmed.
Supporters of the strict libertarian view of property also draw strength
from the foundational role that property played in the development of the
American political system. They maintain that property is a fundamental right,
closely tied to individual liberty and whose protection is the primary object of
government.53 They find support in the words of James Madison, who, in his
famous paper on property, defined it broadly to exist not only in a person’s land
and goods but also “in his opinions and free communication of them . . . in the
safety and liberty of his person, . . . [and] in the free use of his faculties.”54 In
Madison’s view the primary purpose of government was “to protect property of
recognizing public rights in environmental and natural resources under a revamped public
trust doctrine).
53.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33–35, 167–72, 174–78,
333–34 (1974); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11–14
(1927).
54.
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14
JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert Rutland et al. eds.,
1983).
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every sort[.]”55 A government was unjust, according to Madison, when “the
property which a man has in his personal safety and personal liberty, is violated by
arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest.”56 Nor was
government just when “arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to
part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of the
word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called.” 57
Despite the importance that Madison attached to property, he did not
initially push for a specific provision in the Constitution preventing government
from interfering with property rights, hoping instead that the Constitution’s
political structure would provide sufficient protection for property. 58 The relatively
large size of electoral districts favored the election of wealthy candidates because
their social and economic status would mean that they would be better known. 59
Also, Madison and other federalists initially thought that the Constitution’s system
of checks and balances, when combined with the enormity of the federal
government, would minimize the development of factionalism and prevent the
arbitrary elimination or redistribution of property rights. 60
By the time Madison introduced the Takings Clause, however, he
recognized the vulnerability of property rights to aggressive state governments and
property-less majorities.61 State legislatures had started to enact laws favoring
debtors over creditors, causing a loss of faith in the ability of state legislatures to
protect individual property rights from majoritarian exploitation. 62 Although the
framers’ concern for property rights did not result in a broad approach to the
Takings Clause,63 the efforts of Madison and other founding fathers to ensure
constitutional protection of property rights have heavily influenced those scholars
favoring a strict libertarian approach to property. 64

55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 267.
57.
Id. For a contemporary view on how the economic concept of property
corrupts the underlying political system, see Lewis H. Lapham, Feast of Fools, TRUTHDIG
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/feast_of_fools_20120920/.
58.
See Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 245, 246–47, 250–53 (1990).
59.
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 53–57 (1990).
60.
See id. at 35–37.
61.
See id. at 22–25; Rakove, supra note 58, at 253–54. For a discussion of the
different phases in the evolution of Madison’s thinking about property rights, see generally
Rakove, supra note 58.
62.
See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 701, 704–05 (1985).
63.
See id. at 708–13. See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000)
(discussing land use practices during the colonial and early statehood eras).
64.
See generally ELY, supra note 25 (describing some of those influences).
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The milder individual rights view of property also relies on the
importance of property to the development of economic and political systems, but
does not view property rights as absolute.65 Though property still is viewed as a
“source of separation” between the individual and society, greater concern for
other rights and interests pervades this view. 66 Like strict libertarians, adherents to
the more moderate traditional view believe in the fundamental importance of
property rights.67 Unlike strict libertarians, traditionalists take a more friendly view
of uncompensated regulation of property to deal with spillover effects of use. 68
Whereas strict libertarians generally only recognize the legitimacy of regulating
spillover effects that involve physical invasions of neighbors’ property, more
moderate traditionalists understand the importance of regulating some indirect
impacts on neighboring lands and on public health, welfare, and safety. 69 They
recognize the importance of public goods, though they generally define that
concept narrowly as existing when consumption is nonrivalrous and exclusion is
difficult and costly.70 One scholar has attributed the difference in view between
strict libertarians and more moderate traditionalists to the fact that traditionalists
seem to care more about an individual’s opportunity to own and use property than
about the preeminence of the property owner’s dominion and control. 71 To be sure,
certain core property rights are so fundamental to political and economic freedom
that the traditionalists also recognize the need for strong protection. 72 Those core
rights include the right to exclude, the right to transfer property interests free from
unreasonable restraints on alienation, and the right to conduct an economically
viable use.73 When government action deprives a property owner of one of these
rights, more moderate traditionalists generally will find a constitutional violation
regardless of the importance of the public interest. 74 Absent such a deprivation or
65.
See Alexander, supra note 38, at 264–65.
66.
See id.
67.
Id. at 265.
68.
Id. at 265, 267–68.
69.
See FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 102–03. Alexander describes the weaker
version as seeking “to establish a parity between property and political rights rather than the
supremacy of property rights.” Alexander, supra note 38, at 265.
70.
See Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of
Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 358–59 (1990) (discussing different definitions of
public goods).
71.
See FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 101–02.
72.
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures and sales adopted as a response to the Great
Depression); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding a statute affecting a
landowner’s right to exclude because of the housing crisis caused by World War I).
73.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 102. See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (2011) (discussing the critical characteristics of
property).
74.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting the important
public interest ignored under the majority approach—the minimization of damage caused by
hurricanes and storm surges); see also Jonathan Federman, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
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taking, however, traditionalists tend to allow regulation of property’s spillover
effects as long as the regulation is rational and does not unfairly single out an
individual landowner.75
In recent years, the individual rights view of property seems to have
influenced the Supreme Court in resolving some takings claims. 76 Recent takings
decisions have limited the power of government to enforce environmental and land
use laws dealing with spillover effects on common resources. When South
Carolina, for example, decided to prevent a landowner from building any
permanent habitable structure on an ecologically fragile beach, the Court
concluded that the action constituted an unconstitutional taking because it deprived
the landowner of all economically viable use of his land. 77 That the landowner had
already profited from developing other lots in the subdivision did not matter to the
Court.78 Nor was the importance of the public interest of consequence to the Court.
Rather, what mattered was the total wipeout, assumed on appeal, of the right to a
reasonable expectation of gain from using that particular lot. 79 Similarly, when the
California Coastal Commission required landowners to grant the public lateral
access across their beachfront lot in exchange for permission to build a larger
home, the Court found the government action to be an unconstitutional taking. 80
This time the core property right that had been taken was the right to exclude. 81
Although the Court recognized the legitimacy of public rights in the tidelands in
front of the landowners’ property, the Court did not believe that the requirement
that the landowners provide lateral access to the public along the seawall was even
reasonably related to the protection of the public rights. 82

Council: An Antiquated Response to a Modern Problem, 57 ALB. L. REV. 213, 215 (1993)
(stating that erosion in the vicinity of Lucas’s property was so bad that it required twelve
emergency sand replacement orders).
75.
See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44–46 (1960).
76.
See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602, 2606–07, 2609 (2010) (plurality opinion) (asking whether a state
court has eliminated an established property right and denying the power of state courts to
change the common law of property); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–16, 1022–29 (discussing the
“historical compact” of the Takings Clause; the use of the per se approach, which does not
consider the importance of the public interest; the rejection of the traditional noxious use
test; and the importance of preexisting background principles of the state’s common law);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (describing the
right to exclude as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property
rights”).
77.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
78.
See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to
Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 303–06 (Gerald Korngold
& Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
79.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016. But see Federman, supra note 74, at 214–15
(stating that Lucas had been developing land in the area since the late 1970s).
80.
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825–26 (1987).
81.
Id. at 831.
82.
Id. at 837–41 (explaining that the condition of lateral access raised a
“heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement” while
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Over time, the individual rights view of property has focused more on
property as an economic concept than a political one. This shift in focus largely
has occurred as land lost its primacy as the dominant form of wealth and as our
modern capitalist economy emerged. 83 For much of American history, land has
been the backbone of America’s economic and social systems, serving as the
primary source of wealth and the main means of survival. 84 Because of land’s
importance during the early colonial and statehood years, owners tended to
aggregate landholdings. As Alexis de Tocqueville once explained, American
landowners needed large, intact tracts of land to support their families. 85 As the
restraints on the division of land once observed by Tocqueville lost their hold, the
incentives to divide, subdivide, and profit from land grew, and the subdivision and
commodification of land became more common. 86
The growth of the capitalist economy has increasingly conflicted with the
demands of a democratic government that puts a “premium on equality” as well as
on liberty.87 One contemporary commentator recognized this modern conflict as
one identified long ago by ancient political philosophers. He observed that “[a]s
wealth accumulates, men decay, and sooner or later an aristocracy that once might
have aspired to an ideal of wisdom and virtue . . . becomes an oligarchy”; its
members become “so besotted by their faith in money that ‘they . . . imagine there
is nothing that it cannot buy.’” 88 In the United States, the shift to more of an
economic theory of property occurred as other constitutional provisions assumed
some of the political functions traditionally performed by property. As will be
explained later,89 the evolution of property into primarily an economic concept
ultimately could affect property’s resilience—property’s very ability to evolve.

providing a continuous public easement along the beach, and not easing the burdens of
development on public access to the beach).
83.
In early statehood, land was abundant, but as population increased and
economic incentives were used to promote expansion, cultural and societal norms focused
increasingly on individual freedom and rights. See David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land
Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History—Part II: How Anglo-American Land
Law Diverged After American Colonization and Independence, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 295, 355 (1999).
84.
See J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 2, 8–10 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et
al. eds., 1993); Thomas, supra note 83, at 298–99.
85.
See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293–94 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945). See generally RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY:
GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 121–34 (rev. ed. 2004) (describing various land use
patterns employed in early American cities).
86.
As James Ely noted, the view of land as a commodity to be bought or sold
was held even by land speculators in colonial times. James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties
and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 691–92 (2008).
87.
See Lapham, supra note 57; see also NEDELSKY, supra note 59, at 1–3, 17–
25 (discussing the distorting effect of property on constitutional rights).
88.
Lapham, supra note 57 (internal citation omitted).
89.
See infra Part II.B.

864

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:847

2. The Public Good Vision of Property
Under the public good vision of property, owners hold their property
rights subject to the public interest or public good, however that is defined.
Proponents of this view explain that property rights are created by the state and
therefore can be regulated and restricted by the state in its effort to promote
important public or societal goods.90 One version of the public good vision, civil
republicanism, views society as an organic whole and defines the primary ends of
government as the promotion of virtue and the common good. 91 As one historian
observed, “the sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole
formed the essence of republicanism.” 92 Protection of individual rights was not as
important to civic republicans because they “assumed an identity between
individual liberty and the public good.”93 They believed that “individuals living in
a republican society would be willing to exercise a highly self-conscious form of
self-restraint, subordinating their private interests to the good of the state.” 94 A
second, more robust version of the public good vision recognizes that property
owners have a social obligation to promote the development of those capabilities
essential to human flourishing.95 At the core of this theory is the “Aristotelian
notion that the human being is a social and political animal and is not selfsufficient alone.”96 Regardless of the version espoused, the public good theory of
property encompasses a norm of civic virtue and responsibility not present in the
individual rights vision.
The subordination of property rights to the public good, however, is not
total or absolute under the public good vision. Part of the civic responsibility
embraced by this vision focuses on the central role that property plays in our
90.
As Ben Franklin explained: “[P]rivate property . . . is a creature of society
and is subject to the calls of that society, whenever its necessities shall require it, even to its
last farthing; its contribution therefore to the public exigencies are . . . to be considered . . .
the return of an obligation previously received, or the payment of a just debt.” BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of Pennsylvania
(1789), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907).
For a discussion about different definitions of public goods, see Butler, supra note 70, at
358–59.
91.
See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 85–104 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776–1787, at 118–24 (1969).
92.
WOOD, supra note 91, at 53.
93.
Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in
Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 482 (1976).
94.
Id. at 483. Frank Michelman is one of the leading modern proponents of the
republican view of property as a foundation for personal identity and participation in civic
life. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
95.
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 760–73 (2009). See generally ALEXANDER & PENALVER,
supra note 29, at 80–101 (discussing a theory of property rooted in Aristotelian notions of
human flourishing).
96.
Alexander, supra note 95, at 760.
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political system. Through property, citizens become self-sufficient and
independent—two conditions necessary for effective participation in government.
Civic republican theorists reason that, as people become more independent, they
can more effectively participate in and assume the responsibilities of
government.97 A person who is self-sufficient is better equipped to prevail over
self interests and promote the greater public good than a person who depends on
others to survive. As Jefferson also explained, property frees the owner from the
“corruption of morals” that results from dependence.98 Civic virtue flows from and
requires the independence provided by property. Without sufficient private
property, civic virtue and involvement would not exist.99 Thus, property is, in
Carol Rose’s words, “a vitally important institution for socializing self-interested
human beings, and for allowing us to break through our self interest and work
toward mutually desirable ends in a modestly cooperative fashion.”100 In the
American political system, that mutually desirable end is a functioning republican
form of democracy.
As Greg Alexander further explains, the civic republican view of property
reflects the notion that an individual is an “inherently social being, inevitably
dependent on others not only to thrive but even just to survive. This irreducible
interdependency means that individuals owe one another obligations, not by virtue
of consent alone but as an inherent incident of the human condition.” 101 The public
good vision thus recognizes the centrality of property to social stability and civic
virtue; it recognizes that property provides a basis for imposing social obligations
for the good of the community. 102 Instead of viewing property solely as a means
for personal gain, commodification, and speculation, the public good perspective
treats property as a basis for civic participation and social stability. Under the civic
conception of property, then, the “core purpose of property is not to satisfy
individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior normative
vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be structured.” 103
A number of the early takings cases reflect and promote the public good
or civic vision of property. For decades, the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the
power of government to regulate private property when the property owner’s use
was harmful or had become incompatible with the surrounding community. A
97.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 1–2, 12–13, 22–23, 40–41; Butler, supra
note 40, at 995.
98.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 165 (William Peden
ed., 1955).
99.
See Katz, supra note 93, at 483. Civic republicans thus need private
property—especially landed property—to prosper. See id. at 474–75 (discussing Jefferson’s
views on the virtue of landed property).
100.
Rose, supra note 30, at 97; see also id. at 95 (discussing factors supporting
cooperation and individual self-restraint); cf. FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 6, 17–18
(discussing the tradition of cooperation among neighboring landowners).
101.
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 1–2; see also Butler, supra note 40, at 1003.
102.
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 4. In the days of the founding fathers, property
also “anchored the citizen to his . . . rightful place in the proper social hierarchy.” Id.
103.
Id. at 2.
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brick manufacturing plant, for example, was found to be a noxious use, even
though the plant had begun its operations lawfully at a time when the area was
very rural, because the use had become harmful to residential areas that had
subsequently developed around the plant.104 Similarly, in another case, the
Supreme Court allowed the Commonwealth of Virginia to choose between two
incompatible uses on the basis of its economic utility to the region and the state;
Virginia chose to protect apple orchards from nearby cedar trees that produced
cedar rust fatal to the apple trees.105
Over time, as an economic theory of property rights developed, economic
thinking overshadowed the civic republican view of property. The Court declared
the noxious use justification for police power regulation to be a crude, “early
attempt” at distinguishing between compensable takings and valid,
noncompensable police power regulation. 106 When the regulation deprived the
property owner of all economically viable use, the Court would not even consider
the public interest being promoted by the noxious use regulation unless preexisting
background principles limited the owner’s rights. 107 This loss of influence may be
due in part to the dialectical forces at play in property’s evolutionary process. The
interactions of these forces involve a give-and-take, a conflict and compromise
process that allows one main perspective or force to prevail for a while until its
weaknesses lead to discord and change. If mainstream economic theory continues
to take over the institution of property, especially constitutionally protected
property, this dialectical process will cease to be effective, and property will lose
its resilience.
B. The Human Versus Natural Systems Continuum
For centuries, humans have used the property conception to define their
relationship with nature. Sometimes that relationship has reflected a respectful
coexistence grounded in religious beliefs. 108 Other times the relationship has
revolved around a search for human domination and exploitation. 109 Regardless of
how the relationship is defined, it is clear that humans, through their exercise of
property rights, have had profound and sometimes irreversible impacts on their
environment. That is, in addition to playing a fundamental role in political and
economic systems, the institution of property has performed a critical role in
defining a society’s relationship with its foundation ecosystem. The recent
economic focus on individual property rights has tended to lock us into a
104.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1915).
105.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
106.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (1992).
107.
See id. at 1015.
108.
See Susan Hanna & Svein Jentoft, Human Use of the Natural Environment:
An Overview of Social and Economic Dimensions, in RIGHTS TO NATURE 35, 36–38 (Susan
S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996).
109.
See FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 95; RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE
AMERICAN MIND 8–10 (1973); Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis, in ECOLOGY AND RELIGION IN HISTORY 15, 22–27 (David Spring & Eileen Spring
eds., 1974).
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homocentric view of the relationship between humans and nature that aggravates
the adverse impacts of property use on the environment. This homocentric view
runs counter to modern ecosystem science, which understands that humans are a
subset of the larger natural system110 and that the earth is indeed full. Though our
property system began developing at a time when nature was able to absorb the
shocks and disruptions of human use, we now live in a world of finite natural
resources and are borrowing against the future’s natural resource stock. Stated
slightly differently, today’s global economy would need about 1.5 Earths simply to
sustain itself.111 More realistic views of the relationship between humans and their
place in nature are needed to allow for more effective resource and ecosystem
management.
Attempts to put monetary values on the natural system, such as through
cost-benefit analysis, can cloud the relationship between the property system and
biophysical elements of the larger natural system. Consider, for example, the
market for lipstick. One key ingredient of lipstick is oil from the menhaden fish.112
The demand for lipstick thus leads to the catching and harvesting of menhaden for
their oil, a use that is captured through the market price for lipstick. The menhaden
fish, however, is a key element of a complex food web, and removing that element
through overfishing changes the food web relationships, making them vulnerable
to collapse.113 Once the population of menhaden falls too low, the menhaden’s key
food source, phytoplankton, overproduce, and unhealthy eutrophic conditions
develop.114 Further, as the menhaden population declines, top predator species like
the striped bass lose an important food source and begin to starve. 115 As the
population of striped bass falls, economically valuable commercial and
recreational fishing industries suffer.116 Economists are fairly good at measuring
the value of the front-end product, the lipstick, and the back-end product, the
striped bass, but generally do not know how to value the complex
interrelationships that occur within the food chain and the ecosystem. They do not
know how to capture the value of the menhaden as an herbivore feeding on

110.
See JEREMY BENDIK-KEYMER, THE ECOLOGICAL LIFE: DISCOVERING
CITIZENSHIP AND A SENSE OF HUMANITY 5, 64–66 (2006).
111.
Paul Gilding, Opinion, The Earth is Full, CNN (Apr. 8, 2012, 9:39 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/08/opinion/gilding-earth-limits/index.html?hpt=hp_t2. See
generally PAUL GILDING, THE GREAT DISRUPTION (2011) (discussing the great disruption
that will occur in the world’s economic systems because of their assumptions and
limitations unless changes are made).
112.
H. Bruce Franklin, Net Losses: Declaring War on the Menhaden,
MOTHERJONES (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2006/03/netlosses-declaring-war-menhaden.
113.
Id.
114.
Interview with Dennis Taylor, Professor Emeritus of Marine Science,
College of William & Mary, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 23, 2012).
115.
Tom Tavee & H. Bruce Franklin, The Most Important Fish in the Sea,
DISCOVER, Sept. 2001, at 44.
116.
Interview with Dennis Taylor, supra note 114.
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phytoplankton, the impact of overproduction of phytoplankton on the health of the
ecosystem, or the importance of menhaden as a food source to predator species. 117
One of the problems illustrated by this example is the failure of economic
analysis to capture adequately the existence value of human and nonhuman species
and of present and future generations. Economic analysis focuses on the utility of
species and natural resources to humans in evaluating choices and use decisions.
The value of simply existing is generally ignored. 118 To put this in the context of
human existence, climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that the global climate
is changing because of human actions.119 They agree that, unless this trend is
slowed and reversed, the earth’s climate system will eventually reach a tipping
point where recovery is not possible and the climate will be permanently altered in
ways that will threaten the survival of humans.120 Climate scientists unfortunately
cannot identify what that tipping point is or when it will occur. 121 Because many
humans are risk averse in situations involving serious threats to their survival or to
the survival of future generations, a straightforward cost-benefit analysis of that
future threat would not accurately measure their concern about existence value.
The human–natural system continuum should not, in other words, be collapsed and
lost in cost-benefit analysis of utility to humans. Some of the different approaches
to defining preferences for human versus natural systems are explored below, as
well as their relationship with property and the private rights–public goods
continuum.
1. Homocentric Views
Early in America’s colonization, settlors viewed America as a “promised
land”—a land of milk and honey like that which Moses sought or, better yet, a

117.
Id.; see also James E. Kirkley et al., An Assessment of the Social and
Economic Importance of Menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus) (Latrobe, 1802) in Chesapeake
Bay Region, i–ii, pts. 1, 5 (Va. Inst. of Marine Sci. Marine Rep. No. 2011–14, 2011),
available at http://web.vims.edu/GreyLit/VIMS/mrr11-14.pdf (studying the social and
economic importance of menhaden, including their ecological services).
118.
See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique,
REGULATION, Jan.–Feb. 1981, at 33, 40 (explaining how cost-benefit analysis does not
capture the value attached to life); Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1409–10 (1981) (criticizing economic analysis of environmental
problems).
119.
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 1–22 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT].
120.
See NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 25–61 (2007) (discussing the limits of standard externalities and cost-benefit
approaches in analyzing climate change); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 555–62
(2004) (discussing critiques of economic cost-benefit analysis in climate change and other
environmental areas).
121.
See generally IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 119 (discussing longterm prospects and climate sensitivity).
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land like the Garden of Eden. 122 America was a boundless continent—a country of
fertile soils, expansive rivers “teeming with fish,” lush forests full of wildlife, and
a seemingly endless supply of land.123 Captain John Smith was fascinated by the
wild beauty and richness of the New World, once describing Virginia as a “country
that may have the prerogative over the most pleasant places knowne . . . heaven &
earth never agreed better to frame a place for man’s habitation.” 124 The early
settlors thought that the New World would satisfy their needs forever.
Although the New World was a land of abundance, back-breaking labor
was needed to tame the land and make it habitable. The legal system used the
institution of property to encourage and reward this hard work. 125 Justification for
this approach was found in the writings of Locke, who had explained that God
gave the earth “to mankind in common . . . for the support and comfort of their
being,”126 commanding man “to labour . . . . [and] . . . subdue the earth.” 127
Individuals must be allowed to remove natural resources “from the common state”
and make them their own by mixing labor with the resources. 128 By adding labor,
the individual created value that was significant enough to overcome the common
interest.129
Eventually the reality of the hard work and the dangers involved in
settling America led to the development of a bias against wilderness. 130 This
cultural bias involved a physical component that arose from the “formidable
threat” posed by the wilderness to the settlors’ survival.131 The bias against
wilderness also took on moral or religious overtones, with the wilderness
becoming “a dark and sinister symbol.” 132 The settlors “shared the long Western
tradition of imagining wild country as a moral vacuum, a cursed and chaotic
wasteland.”133
The impact of the homocentric, antiwilderness tradition on the property
concept has been far-reaching. Settlors viewed undeveloped wilderness areas as
122.
FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 93.
123.
Id.
124.
John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the
Summer Isles, Book II, 21–22, microformed by University Microfilms, Inc. (1966).
125.
See FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 93–96; Sax, supra note 51, at 6–15
(describing how the law was constructed to promote economic development).
126.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 15 (J. W. Gough ed., MacMillan, new ed., corrected and rev.
1956).
127.
Id. at 17. See generally KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD
(1983) (discussing the evolution of attitudes of the English and other Europeans towards
nature from 1500–1800).
128.
LOCKE, supra note 126, at 15.
129.
See id. at 21–22.
130.
See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 528–30 (1996).
131.
NASH, supra note 109, at 24.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 127, at 17–50.
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wastelands that needed civilization. Land laws encouraged the draining of swamps,
the clearing of forests, and the promotion of economic development and westward
expansion, all at the expense of ecosystems and natural resources. 134 Although
most of those laws no longer apply, the legacy of the antiwilderness bias
remains.135 Many still view wetlands, old growth forests, and vast expanses of
undeveloped public lands as lost economic opportunities. And some still view
undeveloped wilderness areas as wasteful in a religious sense.136
The antiwilderness, proconquest tradition also has contributed to the
development of absolutist attitudes towards property rights, with landowners
having little, if any, sense of accountability to the environment or to the common
interests of the public.137 Land repeatedly was divided into discrete parcels, and
then fenced, seated, or planted. The effects of land use activities on ecosystems
were not considered. Trees were cut, wild animals hunted without limit, and
sewage dumped into pristine waters.138 Settlors practiced the “use-and-move-on”
system of agriculture, planting crops until the land became impoverished and then
moving on to new areas. 139 The seeds of excess were sown along with the crops,
for subduing nature and providing more of life’s comforts were far higher
priorities than minimizing environmental impacts or accounting for external costs
of use. The drive to survive and prosper encouraged landowners to view nature as
a collection of assets to be exploited and controlled.
2. Ecological or Natural System Views
Ecological or natural system views gained acceptance in the 1800s as
more of America became settled and urbanized. An increasing number of
Americans recognized that wilderness had value even without labor,140 and a
number of authors and commentators wrote about the breathtaking beauty of the
American wilderness.141 Despite this nascent appreciation for nature, the
134.
See, e.g., BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 52, at § 8.1; John F. Hart,
Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1252, 1280–81 (1996). See generally Sax, supra note 51 (discussing how the rules of
land ownership shaped the development of America).
135.
See Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and
Notions of Relativity, 1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 636–40 (discussing the origins of private land
use expectations, including the exploitative use expectation and the absolutist expectation).
136.
Secretary of the Interior James Watt once declared that his “responsibility is
to follow the Scriptures which call upon us to occupy the land until Jesus returns.” Colman
McCarthy, James Watt & the Puritan Ethic, WASH. POST, May 24, 1981, at L5.
137.
See Sax, supra note 51, at 5–7 (discussing the settlors’ transformative
process); Sprankling, supra note 130, 521–85 (discussing the development of the
antiwilderness bias of American property law).
138.
See Sax, supra note 51, at 5–7.
139.
Id. at 6–7 (describing the use-and-move-on philosophy).
140.
See NASH, supra note 109, at 44; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 41, at 96.
141.
See, e.g., JOHN JAMES AUDUBON, WRITINGS AND DRAWINGS (Christoph
Irmscher compilation, Literary Classics of the U.S., Inc. 1999) (detailing his journeys
through the American wilderness in the 1800s through prose, letters, and bird biographies);
WILLIAM BARTRAM, TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Thomas P. Slaughter compilation,
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antiwilderness tradition continued to dominate legal thought. Whatever
appreciation for wilderness that emerged largely coexisted with—instead of
displacing—the tradition.142 Eventually this appreciation led to the development of
a green view of property that included a stewardship ethic. 143
In the mid-1900s the notion of an environmental or land ethic was given a
major boost by Aldo Leopold. In his famous book A Sand County Almanac,
Leopold wrote of the impending danger to Earth’s remaining wilderness areas.
Making a plea for their preservation, Leopold noted the change in the relationship
between nature and Americans. While the wilderness may have been “an
adversary” to the settlor in the “sweat of his labor,” wilderness gave “definition
and meaning” to the life of the settlor “in repose.”144 He explained how “[n]o
living man will see again the long-grass prairie, where a sea of prairie flowers
lapped at the stirrups of the pioneer.”145 Nor would they see “the virgin pineries of
the Lake States, or the flat woods of the coastal plan, or the giant hardwoods.” 146
Wilderness areas of short-grass prairies and other trees, however, still existed and
could be preserved.147
To make the case for preservation, Leopold argued that ethics had
evolved over time to encompass nature. According to Leopold, all ethics “rest
upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in that
community, but his ethics prompt him also to cooperate.”148 Leopold’s land ethic
recognizes that use of land involves the whole community, including the soils,
waters, plants, and animals. Although the land ethic does not argue against the
management and use of land, it affirms the right of the whole land community to
continue to exist “at least in spots.” 149 Leopold viewed the land ethic as an
ecological necessity.150 To continue to follow the conquest or antiwilderness
approach would eventually be “self-defeating.”151 Humans could not fully
Literary Classics of the U.S., Inc. 1996) (describing his journeys through the American
wilderness from 1773–1776 in celebratory prose). See generally RODERICK FRAZIER NASH,
THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 55–86 (1989) (describing
the development of modern environmental ethics in America).
142.
See NASH, supra note 109, at 55.
143.
The emergence of a sense of appreciation for nature helped to remove some
of the old, negative attitudes about nature. See id. at 65–66; see also PAUL W. TAYLOR,
RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 99–168 (1986) (setting forth
the core beliefs of a biocentric view).
144.
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE 188 (1987). For further discussion of Leopold’s impact, see Eric T. Freyfogle,
Leopold’s Last Talk, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL. 236 (2012); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land
Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990).
145.
LEOPOLD, supra note 144, at 189.
146.
Id.
147.
See id.
148.
Id. at 203–04.
149.
Id. at 204.
150.
Id. at 203.
151.
Id. at 204.
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understand what really makes an ecosystem tick—what parts are essential and
what parts unimportant to the system. 152 Further, the land ethic could not, in
Leopold’s view, be based solely on economic motives because they tend to ignore
parts of the land community that lack clear commercial value but are essential to
ecological well-being.153 Rather, Leopold advocated that each use be evaluated “in
terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically
expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” 154
This ecological and ethical view of the relationship between humans and
nature has had some limited impact on the definition of property rights. In the
classic 1972 case Just v. Marinette County, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
decided that a landowner “has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others.” 155 In Just the
landowner had asked the court to invalidate a shoreland zoning ordinance that
prevented landowners from changing the natural character of their land within
1000 feet of a navigable lake and 300 feet of a navigable river without a permit. 156
The purpose of the ordinance was to protect navigable waters and accompanying
public rights from degradation resulting from “uncontrolled use and development
of shorelands.”157 The court restricted the landowner to the use of his sensitive
wetland area in its natural state, explaining that private property rights do not
include the right to change the character of the land at the expense of existing
public trust rights.158 Government could prevent harm to public rights in navigable
waters by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses. 159 Nature, in other
words, imposes limits on a property owner’s rights in land.
Although Just remains popular among environmentalists, most other
courts have not adopted its natural use approach to property rights. 160 As admirable
as the philosophy is, it commits a fatal error: It embraces nature totally and
152.
See id.
153.
See id. at 214.
154.
Id. at 224–25.
155.
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
156.
See id. at 765–66.
157.
Id. at 764–65.
158.
Id. at 768–71. The Justs had filled in wetlands without a permit after
subdividing a larger tract and selling off other parcels. Id. at 766.
159.
See id. at 768.
160.
See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 395–96
(1988); Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the
Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 883 (1997). But see Graham v.
Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981) (“We agree with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s observations in Just v. Marinette County, where that court pointed out the
involvement of exceptional circumstances because of the interrelationship of the wetlands,
swamps and natural environment to the purity of the water and natural resources such as
fishing.”); Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1975) (citing Just and finding that a
denial of a permit to fill a saltmarsh did not constitute a taking), overruled by Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981).
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absolutely without regard for social institutions and human needs. The Just
approach commits the same type of error as the strict libertarian approach,
focusing on one ideal in the context of one system and ignoring the implications of
that ideal for other systems critical to the definition of a successful relationship
between humans and natural systems. To be acceptable and therefore have a
chance at being effective, a system that defines the preferences for human interests
and natural systems must be dynamic, recognizing the fluid nature of the
relationship and its dependence on context.
C. Competing for Dominance Versus Dialectical Interactions
The ideals reflected at the end of each continuum are not very tolerant of
one another. Proponents of a particular end-state ideal typically describe it in terms
that suggest little room for accommodation or for functioning relations with other
approaches. The proponents typically portray potential solutions as either/or
choices, not as questions of degree or variable-driven situations. Competition for
dominance, rather than compromise and accommodation, controls the resolution of
conflicts and definition of property rights. This competition for dominance has
become more telling in recent years with the emergence of the economic vision of
property and its preference for individual, market-based choices occurring with
minimal government regulation.
Although a system of end-state ideals competing for dominance may well
reflect the language and nature of academic debate, it does not serve the institution
of property or society well. Portrayal of each perspective in terms of pure, endstate ideals locked in a battle for dominance suggests that there is no room for
competing ideals, not even in those gray situations existing in real life. Though it is
important to describe the ideals that may define the norms of the property concept,
it is also important to remember that no one end-state ideal can be the true and full
measure of the property concept in a pluralistic society.161 No end-state ideal can
adequately reflect the totality of the property landscape. End-state ideals may set
outer limits or boundaries, but they cannot possibly capture the constant
interactions over property occurring in the real world among government leaders,
jurists, policymakers, and individual actors. At least in a democratic or pluralist
society, the institution of property is a function of the interactions of different
ideals or gradations of ideals, whether end-state, mid-state, or nascent. These
interactions involve much give-and-take, pendulum swinging, and sometimes even
plane-shifting among different theories of property. Flexibility, variety or diversity
of perspective, and functional redundancy are all needed to ensure that the
property concept evolves effectively over time.
Imagine, for the sake of discussion, that the private rights–public goods
and the human–natural systems continua represent two axes of a Cartesian plane.
Let’s call the private rights–public goods continuum that reflects choices about
property arrangements the x-axis, and the continuum about the degree of
preference for human versus natural systems the y-axis. The four quadrants formed
161.
See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1600, 1637–44 (2008).
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by the intersecting continua would include: Quadrant I, capturing the interactions
of the private side of the property arrangements continuum with the homocentric
views of the human versus natural systems continuum; Quadrant II, showing the
interactions of preferences for the public goods side of the property arrangements
continuum with preferences for homocentric views of the human versus nature
continuum; Quadrant III, representing the interactions of various preferences
moving toward the public good end-state ideal in relation to points moving toward
the natural systems ideal; and Quadrant IV, reflecting the interactions among
preferences for private rights property arrangements and for natural systems.

Human Alteration
Quadrant II

Quadrant I

Public

Private

Quadrant III

Quadrant IV
Nature

Figure 1. The Property Landscape as a Function of Preferences for Human
versus Natural Systems
The end-state ideal of each continuum tends to restrict the property
concept to a particular quadrant. The mainstream economic vision, for example,
would not likely recognize the desirability of the property arrangements solidly in
Quadrants II and III because some norms or characteristics critical to the economic
vision would be altered or sacrificed if the ecological or public goods ideals
prevailed or were promoted significantly. The mainstream economic vision
assumes that the decisionmaker is a rational actor seeking to maximize his or her
own net expected utility. In defining property rights, the mainstream vision favors
giving the individual rational actor the right of exclusivity, the right to transfer and
take economic risks, and the right to reap the rewards of adding labor to a
resource.162 The economic vision would define Quadrant I as the area best defining
the key traits of its ideal and would resist efforts to push property into other
162.
See POSNER, supra note 73, § 3.1 (2011) (discussing essential characteristics
of property rights under economic theory).
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quadrants. Though private rights arrangements also could be found in Quadrant
IV, where stronger preferences for natural systems appear, mainstream economics
tends to assume the natural environment is an input and throughput for
individually based economic activities and thus does not accurately value
preferences for nature and the environment.
This tendency to view the property landscape from only one end-state
ideal does not accurately reflect the development of the institution of property,
especially common law property. Instead of tying the property concept to one
ideal, the common law has allowed property to develop through a dialectical
process of advocacy, deliberation, and reasoning. In that process one ideal or norm
may control the definition of property for a time or in a particular context until that
dominant ideal creates troubling conflicts with or unacceptable costs to other
interests. Eventually, challenges to the ideal’s dominant position begin to succeed,
and other ideals are increasingly accommodated.163 At any point in time, in other
words, the property concept is a function of the interaction of different gradations
of ideals along each continuum. The actual end-state ideals are just one part of the
process of defining property—a necessary but insufficient part of the process.
Rather, the full landscape of property includes functional relations from all four
quadrants of a variable-based plane of property, with one continuum being the
range of property arrangements, from private to public, and the other being a
variable affecting the choice of property arrangements—here, the preference for
human versus natural systems. As discussed later, other variables or constraints
may also be involved.164
Although the federal constitutional role of property admittedly could limit
the quadrant areas available in defining the common law concept of property, such
limitations have not arisen until recently for a number of reasons. First, the federal
constitutional provisions protecting property simply are too few and too vague to
provide compelling justifications for constraining the common law concept. Some
scholars have argued that the Takings Clause reflects a particular view of
property.165 Though that view may have motivated some founding fathers to
support the adoption of the Takings Clause, there is no compelling evidence that
the Takings Clause itself reflects one interpretive view and excludes all others. 166
Second, the U.S. Constitution generally leaves the definition of property to the

163.
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 456–57 (2002) (using trespass to
discuss alternate approaches to defining property rights).
164.
See infra Part III.B.
165.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 15–16. But cf. Marc R. Poirier, The
Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002) (describing and
extolling the virtue of vagueness in takings).
166.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003–04 (1992)
(adopting a categorical approach to regulations that prevent environmental harm in a way
that deprives the landowner of all economically viable use).
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various states.167 Under state common law, the landscape of property has included
all four quadrants to varying degrees.168 Part II will examine how the economic
vision of property has led to the coupling of constitutional theory and common law
property and will explain why this coupling is disturbing.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUPLING OF MAINSTREAM
ECONOMICS AND PROPERTY
In recent years, the economic vision of property, with its focus on
individual rights and autonomy, has been coupled with constitutional principles to
produce a more forceful conception of property better able to withstand
government regulation. This coupling, which has occurred primarily through the
rubric of the Takings Clause, raises serious questions of validity about efforts to
promote public goods, protect ecosystems and natural resources from degradation
and depletion, and otherwise handle problems raised by significant changing
conditions. By giving primacy to the individual autonomy interest in private
property, especially landed property, the economic view is encouraging the
commodification of natural resources through marketplace incentives and ignoring
the long-term, cumulative costs of property use to ecosystems and societies. By
focusing on individual rights at a microeconomic level, economic theory is
ensuring that battles over environmental and resource management programs may
be waged more easily on an ad hoc, individual basis as use decisions are made. By
associating with constitutionally protected property, the economic view is making
it easier for individual property owners to attack specific government regulations,
which will no longer be reviewed summarily as normal and legitimate economic
regulation.169 If the economic view becomes solidified as the key theory of
constitutional and common law property, the obstacles to environmental and
resource protection, to land use regulation, and to the promotion of public goods
will become monumental.
Even without its elevated constitutional status, the economic view of
property makes it more difficult for government to promote public goods, protect
ecosystems and natural resources, and pursue other activities that do not fit neatly
within the analytical structure of mainstream economics. Not all schools of
economic thought pose the same level of difficulty. Environmental economics, for
example, agrees that market approaches do not work well for all situations and that
167.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2615 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“State courts generally operate under a
common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law . . . .”).
168.
For discussion about the full landscape of property, see generally Lee Anne
Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907 (2004); Elinor Ostrom, The
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
807 (2010); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1 (1991).
169.
See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 5.37 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the
deferential standard of judicial review traditionally applied to economic regulation of land
use unless a fundamental right is involved).
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government action might be needed to solve serious market failures involving
negative externalities in the environmental area.170 Behavioral economics
recognizes that the rational actor assumption does not accurately capture how
people make decisions in the real world. 171 Ecological economics views the earth
as full and challenges the assumption of continued growth, seeing the natural
resource stock as a primary limitation.172 Mainstream economics, however, tends
to be more restrictive in its thinking, assuming the decisionmaker is a rational
actor, accepting the initial distribution of resources, treating all interests as having
a dollar equivalency, and believing that more is possible as long as knowledge
expands.173 Even though mainstream economics agrees that government must
provide public goods, it more narrowly defines that category to apply only when
exclusion is difficult and costly to implement and consumption is nonrivalrous.
Others taking a broader approach would recognize public goods (or inherently
public property) when private markets predictably fail to produce needed goods
and the costs of private negotiation are high or a serious land assembly problem
exists.174
Part II.A examines the coupling of mainstream economics and
constitutional principles protecting property rights. After discussing how the
coupling has occurred, Part II.B explores the impact of the coupling on the
institution of property, particularly on its resilience and its ability to adapt. Part III
will conclude with a discussion of the importance of decoupling economic theory
and property, focusing in large part on the importance of the dialectical process
used to define property through its relationships with other norms and variables.
A. The Coupling Problem
Two traits or aspects of traditional property rights have been used as a
foundation for strengthening the relationship between the economic vision of
170.
For a discussion of environmental economics, see generally CLIFFORD S.
RUSSELL, APPLYING ECONOMICS TO THE ENVIRONMENT (2001).
171.
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–79 (1998). See generally
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2001) (discussing how heuristics
and biases affect decisionmaking, valuation, and risk regulation).
172.
See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 3–5 (1996); Douglas A. Kysar,
Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4–
8 (2001) (discussing mainstream economics and its critics). See generally Robert Costanza
et al., Goals, Agenda, and Policy Recommendations for Ecological Economics, in
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 1, 3–7
(Robert Costanza ed., 1991) (explaining ecological economics and how it differs from
conventional economic approaches).
173.
See Mark Sagoff, Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics, 45
BIOSCIENCE 610, 610–12 (1995) (comparing and contrasting mainstream economics and
ecological economics). See generally Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of
Economics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 53 (Dec. 1985) (describing the classical model and its
limitations).
174.
See Rose, supra note 52, at 774–81; see also Butler, supra note 70, at 323,
358–59 (discussing different definitions of public goods).
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property and constitutional protection. One trait involves the absolutist/exclusion
thinking that controlled early development of the common law concept of property
and is still very much part of the debate over the core of property. 175 The second is
the productive labor, exploitation perspective existing in property law since its
early development.176 Both have provided a basis for constitutionalizing the
mainstream economic theory of property through the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
1. The Absolutist/Exclusion Hook
The absolutist, exclusion-based view of property controlled the early
development of common law property. Blackstone, in his influential work
Commentaries, famously described property as “that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 177 Declaring
property to be one of the “absolute” rights “inherent in every Englishman,” 178
Blackstone defined property broadly as the “free use, enjoyment, and disposal of
all . . . acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the
land.”179 Though Blackstone’s view of property was far more complex and
nuanced than his bold statement suggests, 180 his description has come to epitomize
the individual rights conception of property. 181 At the core of the Blackstonian
conception were the right to “despotic” or absolute dominion and the right to
“sole” or exclusive control.182
Blackstone’s approach to property reflected a physical model of property
that stressed discrete tracts of land having distinct boundaries and including the
surface, subsurface, and airspace falling within a column framed by those
boundaries.183 In the late nineteenth century, the physical model yielded to a more
abstract model that viewed property rights as a bundle of sticks. 184 Though certain
core attributes remained, any one stick in the bundle of rights might be severed and
175.
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163, at 455–57 (discussing the exclusion and
governance strategies as two ways to define and enforce property rights).
176.
See Sax, supra note 51, at 2–3 (also recognizing these two aspects of
property as shaping our thinking).
177.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
178.
1 id. at *138.
179.
Id.
180.
For further discussion of Blackstone’s conception, see Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603–12 (1998);
David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
103, 106–17 (2009). See also Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands,
43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 99–102 (1995) (discussing the ambiguities and logical limitations of
the Blackstonian conception of property).
181.
Schorr, supra note 180, at 104.
182.
See id. at 104–05.
183.
See Freyfogle, supra note 180, at 97–98.
184.
See id. at 98; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract,
and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 373, 373–77 (2002); Krier, supra note 30, at 139–42; Rose, supra note 30, at 95.
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transferred by the property owner or restricted by government. The development of
the bundle of rights view allowed the owned property to be viewed as a
commodity to be used, disaggregated, developed, or transferred in the
marketplace.185 As the bundle of rights view took hold and land development
increased, the notion of absolute ownership eroded. Although the absolutist
approach to property may have worked well in an agrarian society, it posed
problems in a society that valued commercial and industrial development. 186
Millworks, railroads, and industrial uses imposed harmful effects on neighboring
landowners yet provided significant benefits to society. Gradually the courts chose
to protect the new industrial uses and public works by rejecting a truly absolutist
perspective, adopting instead a relativity of property approach. Landowners no
longer could count on stopping or even receiving compensation for harmful
interferences that once could be remedied in court. Instead, the strength of property
rights varied more according to the context and the competing interests. 187
Despite the common law’s retreat from the absolutist approach, some of
its core principles still find resonance in the contemporary exclusion strategy,
which has been repackaged and strengthened using mainstream economics. It is
this strategy that has played a significant role in the intertwining of economic
theory, common law property, and, ultimately, constitutionally protected property.
Viewed by many as the core of property, 188 the exclusion strategy recognizes the
importance of giving decisionmaking power over a resource to its owner. 189 That
power not only includes the right to exclude but also the right to take economic
risks, to decide on uses, to transfer all or part of the property, to enjoy the property,
and so on. Mainstream economics easily justifies the exclusion strategy as
necessary to an efficient allocation of resources, giving property owners the
incentives needed for productive use and maximization of welfare. 190
In recent years the right to exclude has become a rallying cry of property
rights advocates, who describe it as fundamentally linked to personal and
economic freedom.191 That cry has been increasingly persuasive in judicial and
legislative settings192 because it highlights the autonomy interest inherent in the
185.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 1–4, 319–23.
186.
See Freyfogle, supra note 180, at 100–01.
187.
See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970); see
also Freyfogle, supra note 180, at 99–102 (discussing the evolution of an abstract
conception of property). See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 31–42, 47–53 (1979) (discussing the transformation of the
property concept from the absolute view to one favoring economic development).
188.
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 27, at 734–35. But see Gregory S. Alexander,
The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1063–66 (2009) (discussing an
alternative view of property’s core).
189.
See Merrill, supra note 27, at 740–41.
190.
See Smith, supra note 163, at 454–55, 468–71.
191.
See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, Why Are Private Property Rights Important?,
PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Aug. 17, 2012), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2012/whyare-private-property-rights-important/.
192.
See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (describing the right to exclude as the “hallmark of a
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decisionmaking power of the property owner under the common law. By
identifying with the autonomy interest, property advocates then are well positioned
to take the leap by association193 to the autonomy interests protected by the
Takings Clause, bringing the exclusion strategy into the “constitutional history” of
the Takings Clause.194 The Court’s decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp. to find a compensable taking any time a physical invasion occurs, no
matter how small or how beneficial it is, demonstrates this reasoning. 195 In that
case the Court concluded that mandating the installation of cable on rental
buildings caused a physical invasion, and thus a deprivation of the right to exclude,
even though the cable was placed on the exterior, only occupied a few inches, and
made the rental premises more attractive to potential tenants. The freedom to say
“no” reflected in the exclusion approach to property was violated. It did not matter
that the law served important tenants’ interests in receiving news and other
programming by cable. Once the law was viewed as a simple physical invasion
violating the property owner’s power and right to exclude, a more accommodating
approach was not allowed. Though some have disagreed with Loretto’s accounting
of constitutional history and use of the categorical approach,196 subsequent
decisions of the Court have reaffirmed not only the use of the categorical approach
for permanent physical occupations but also the description of constitutional
history as always taking such an approach, no matter how small the invasion or
how important the public interest.197
It is the categorical approach of the Court’s decision in Loretto and
reinforced in later opinions that reveals the seductive effect of mainstream
economics. Because of the categorical approach, the speech interests of the tenants
in receiving news and other cable programming are never considered. In some of
her famous work on commons, Elinor Ostrom warns against the dangerous
influence of fixed or categorical thinking, which frames the issue or discussion in
terms of dichotomies, leading to misalignments and an inability to adapt.198 Frank
constitutionally protected property interest”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979) (describing the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights”); see also Mihaly & Smith, supra note 6, at 705–06; cf. Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108–10 (2009)
(discussing political reactions to the Kelo decision).
193.
Cf. BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 171, at pt. II (discussing
how heuristics and biases affect decisionmaking).
194.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982).
195.
See id. at 434–35.
196.
Justice Blackmun, for example, decried the use of such an “inherently
suspect” approach in his dissenting opinion in Loretto. Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He contended that the categorical approach was not consistent with constitutional history
and did not further equity. Id. at 442–43.
197.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
198.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6–8, 13–15 (1990). Ostrom writes that the “power of
a theory is exactly proportional to the diversity of situations it can explain” and admonishes
policy analysts not to confuse a model with a theory. Id. at 24.

2013]

RESILIENCE OF PROPERTY

881

Michelman also warns against the use of such an approach because “its capacity to
distinguish, even crudely, between significant and insignificant losses is too puny
to be taken seriously.”199 Mainstream economics enables the leap to constitutional
property to occur because of its focus on the micro level—on the individual deal
and the individual rights holder.200 Left out of the equation is the macro structure,
the impact of the individual deal on that structure and on competing rights and
interests. Categorical thinking allows mainstream economics to justify and solidify
its micro focus. The beauty of the market is that it works efficiently without a
central coordinator, without rules defining positions or players in the market, and
without a defined or central purpose.201 It is this efficient decisionmaking
approach, however, that leads to individualistic thinking that ignores third-party
and macro interests. Human systems are complex, fluid systems requiring much
more.202
2. The Productive Labor or Exploitation Hook
The second important aspect used to bolster the tie between economic
theory and the property concept involves the productive use or exploitation
perspective of property law. Principles and policies governing property rights
historically have stressed the importance of encouraging economic activities and
promoting productive use.203 To the American settlor, productive use meant an
affirmative use that added value and created goods important not only to survival
but also to a comfortable life. Donald Worster’s description of the conditions,
culture, and practices leading up to the devastating Dust Bowl of the 1930s is most
telling. He observes that from the moment the first tobacco crops were planted in
the original colonies, “all-out production was a part of the New World way to
farm. It was on this continent that the creed of maximization developed furthest,
until it came eventually to dominate and characterize the American response to the
land.”204 By the 1900s each key agricultural region in the United States followed
the creed of maximization. Landowners found cash crops that worked in each
environment and then followed a practice of “unlimited increase. . . . Produce,
produce, produce” became the mantra of American land use.205

199.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1227 (1967).
200.
See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
201.
See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3–6 (1965).
202.
See John R. Nolon & Patricia E. Salkin, Integrating Sustainable
Development Planning and Climate Change Management: A Challenge to Planners and
Land Use Attorneys, 63 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 4 (2011); Poirier, supra note 165, at 93
(explaining the virtue of vagueness when a complex system like property is involved).
203.
For discussion of how colonial and early statehood land laws promoted an
exploitation perspective and economic development, see BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note
52, § 8.1; MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
394–411 (1953); HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 31–62.
204.
DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL 182 (1979) (25th anniv. ed. 2004).
205.
Id. at 182; see also Sax, supra note 51, at 6 (describing how the law was
constructed to drive the economy forward through a “use-and-move-on” philosophy). In the
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So strong is the tradition of encouraging productive use that some
Supreme Court Justices have described the right to conduct an economically viable
use as part of the “historical compact” reflected in the Takings Clause. 206
According to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas, protection of this
historical compact requires a categorical rule finding an unconstitutional taking
whenever government action deprives a property owner of all economically viable
use unless the government restriction “inhere[s] in the title itself.”207 Under this
categorical rule, no inquiry is made into the importance of the public interest
advanced in support of the government action. 208 By creating a categorical rule, the
Court confers constitutional stature equivalent to a physical taking on the
economic interest underlying the private use that triggered the government
regulation.
This conferral flows from the holding of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, which is widely acknowledged as the origin of the regulatory takings
doctrine.209 In that decision, the Court announced that government regulation could
go too far by restricting property so significantly that the regulation would be
functionally equivalent to a physical appropriation or destruction of the property.
A key factor used in deciding whether government regulation had gone too far was
the extent of the diminution in value caused by the regulation. In determining
whether the diminution in value was tantamount to a physical appropriation, only
the private economic impact mattered; a legitimate public interest could not save
the government action under the Takings Clause. 210 The functional equivalence
reasoning of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon elevates the private economic
interest over the public interest in takings analysis and ties the economic interest
directly to the physical takings concept. The implication is that the economic
interest at stake in Mahon—the right to exploit or the right to an economically
viable use—was equivalent to the autonomy interest protected in physical takings.
B. The Impact of Coupling and the Need for Resilience
The previous Section discussed how the economic vision of property is
acquiring constitutional stature. A critical question to ask in evaluating the impact
of that shift is: Why does this phenomenon matter? This Section will address that
question, demonstrating that the intertwining of mainstream economics and
property in both the common law and the constitutional setting will have adverse
effects on the institution of property. The coupling ignores alternative visions of
context of the American Great Plains, the results were disastrous. For further description of
those results, see generally Worster’s award-winning book, supra note 204.
206.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
207.
Id. at 1028–29.
208.
See id. at 1015–17.
209.
260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 208–18 (2004) (discussing the
impact of Mahon); but see J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 97–106 (1995) (disputing the impact of
Mahon).
210.
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
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property that have played important roles in the development of our social and
political systems and in our normative structures. These alternative visions have
been an important part of the property dialogue, and to exclude them now from
that dialogue will produce significant skewing of property norms, principles, and
policies. Rather than develop from a single normative theory, property rights have
evolved slowly over time through a dialectical process of debate, deliberation, and
adjustment dependent on the individual context, the prevailing social and physical
conditions, and the cultural norms of a particular time and place. By coupling
property to only one theory, lawmakers are opening the door to misalignments of
property arrangements with norms and conditions (both socioeconomic and
biophysical), and are threatening the resilience of property. Section II.B.1
discusses the dangers of this coupling process, while Section II.B.2 examines the
importance of resilience to the institution of property.
1. The Dangers of Coupling
The coupling of the economic vision of property with constitutional
theory poses significant dangers. One basic problem is that it retells the
constitutional history of property in a way that is much clearer and simpler than
what many scholars believe to be the case. Those scholars agree that, around the
time of the passage of the Takings Clause, government extensively regulated
private property without paying just compensation and that the only type of
compensable government appropriation was a physical taking. 211 Many scholars
also agree that no single political ideology clearly controlled the revolutionary and
early nationhood periods; rather, ideologies changed significantly over time and,
even within particular camps, many different views of property flourished. 212 In
addition, decisions of early courts show that they considered the public interest

211.
See HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 63–67 (noting that little compensation was
given until the 1820s and 1830s and that the idea of compensation was only gradually
accepted); Hart, supra note 134, at 1259–81 (surveying colonial land use laws that regularly
regulated private land use for a broad array of purposes promoting the public good and
concluding that the Court’s assumption of a historical practice of minimal land use
regulation was unsupported); Treanor, supra note 62, at 695–98 (noting that colonial laws
and early statehood constitutions did not recognize a right to just compensation); see also
Hart, supra note 63, at 1099–101 (concluding that the conventional history of early
American land use law is misplaced and wrong). For a discussion of the role of history, see
Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 632–46
(1996).
212.
See, e.g., NEDELSKY, supra note 59, at 92–93 (discussing some of the
different views at play among the Federalists); Nestor M. Davidson, Sketches for a
Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053,
1059–61 (2011) (linking Hamilton to a theory of property based on social function as well
as entrepreneurship); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 819–25, 855–80 (1995)
(examining different theories and understandings of the Takings Clause and proposing a
process-based approach). For further discussion of the political theory debates surrounding
property, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 31.
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important even in the context of claims of constitutionally protected property. 213
The constitutional focus was not just on the affected private property rights or their
defensive need for protection.214 History instead tells us that the story of property
has involved a partnership and “continuing struggle . . . between public and
private” ordering, not a separation into two different spheres.215 The evolution of
property has not been about either/or choices between private rights and collective
interests but rather about the appropriate mix or “interface between individual and
collective entitlements,”216 given cultural, political, socioeconomic, and resource
conditions. The “historical compact” of the Takings Clause that some Supreme
Court Justices have espoused in recent years thus is not so clear or so certain as
they suggest.217
Further, if the coupling of the economic vision with constitutional theory
continues, the relationship between common law property and constitutionally
protected property will be fundamentally altered. The common law courts of each
state have traditionally been the guardians of the institution of property. Those
courts define the basic rules, standards, and policies governing property rights for
daily use.218 The U.S. Supreme Court may, at times, need to examine those state
213.
The noxious use cases are good examples of this point. See, e.g., Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662–68
(1887); see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 420–21 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the importance of the public interest).
214.
Horwitz attributes the gradual acceptance of the compensation principle to
the development of the common law limitation on recovery of consequential damages in
nuisance, the switch from jury to judge, and the need to allow public improvements without
tremendous liability resulting from the impact of public works on private landowners.
HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 66, 71–74, 84–85, 97–99. Treanor notes how the courts
sometimes denied compensation for land taken to build roads because of the republican
theory that regarded property as a creature of the state held subject to the public good.
Treanor, supra note 62, at 695. For a discussion of the defensive nature of constitutionally
protected property, see generally Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Protection for
Property Rights and the Reasons Why: Distrust Revisited, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 217 (2012).
215.
David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for
Economic Development, 1 ACCT., ECON., & L., Iss. 1, Art. 3, at 21–23 (2011), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/publications/Property%20Rights%20and%20
Economic%20Development.pdf; see OSTROM, supra note 198, at 14 (“Institutions are rarely
either private or public—‘the market’ or ‘the state.’ Many successful . . . institutions are rich
mixtures of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions defying classification in a sterile
dichotomy.”).
216.
Fennell, supra note 33, at 16–17. Although some scholars have made
persuasive cases for a particular theory of constitutionally protected property, others have
made similar cases for different theories. Compare, e.g., Michelman, supra note 199, at
1227 with EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 15–16. When there is room for reasoned debate, a onedimensional view does not make sense—not given property’s dialectical process of
evolution. See generally OSTROM, supra note 198.
217.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992).
218.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2597–99 (2010).
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law principles to evaluate government action affecting property rights in light of
constitutional protections for property.219 Some Justices of the Supreme Court have
questioned state courts’ role in defining property, warning state courts to be careful
to engage only in “objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents”220
and requiring a search for “background principles” grounded in the common law
of property or nuisance in evaluating the validity of laws producing a loss of all
economically viable use under the Takings Clause. 221 They have also decried the
use of “nonexistent rules of state substantive law”222 and directed state courts to
require “some sort of individualized determination” in evaluating land use
regulatory conditions.223 Rather than the bottom-up approach allowing property
law to be defined at the ground level, a top-down process of defining property
would control.224 Rather than applying a deferential standard of review, the
Justices would narrow the discretion of state courts in reviewing conditions
imposed in a land use regulatory process.
This less flexible, top-down approach represents a fundamental change in
how the institution of property operates, limiting the ability of common law
property to consider and adjust to interactions between formal rules and structures
and informal norms, practices, and customs. Such interactions are needed to ensure
that the formal side of property does not become too rigid or embedded with
options and assumptions leading property down a singular path that may ignore
important potential adjustments.225 Our property system has a number of options
embedded in its structure that allow property to work well at the margin, with
minimal judicial review, by making assumptions about strategic choices and
default rules.226 Property’s embedded options, for example, include assumptions
about the allocation of risks of gains and losses between grantors and grantees and
about the gatekeeper’s or owner’s flexibility to structure her own deals. 227 Other
219.
See, e.g., id.
220.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
221.
Id. at 1029.
222.
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
223.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
224.
See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1613–14 (2010) (discussing the top–down versus bottom–up
debate).
225.
See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 54 (expressing a similar view).
226.
See Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 239, 241–48 (2012); Fennell, supra note 33, at 17; Kennedy,
supra note 215, at 4; see also Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the
Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863, 884–89, 896–908 (2010) (discussing how
embedded “scripts” result from and affect a firm’s decisionmaking process and handling of
strategic behavior transaction costs). See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE
STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005) (exploring the application of option theory to
property law).
227.
See Fennell, supra note 226, at 239–40. For cases dealing with allocation of
risk under a lease, see, for example, Smith v. McEnany, 48 N.E. 781 (Mass. 1897), and
Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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embedded options include a preference for private ordering of property rights and
a property analytic for choosing between private and public ordering by
determining whether a property rule is market supporting or market distorting.228
The economic vision of property embeds choices and assumptions that
direct property arrangements along certain normative paths, limiting interactions
with and access to other paths. Efficiency, the guiding norm of the economic
vision,229 has led to a focus on allocation of interests in resources and away from
other important norms and factors. Because of this focus, distribution of resources
has become at best an assumption of trickle-down economics230 and at worst an
assumed responsibility of some other institution or system. 231 While a strategy of
exclusion incentivizes property owners to maximize wealth, it also creates a
“dichotomy of choices” that leads to inflexibility. 232 Rigidity tends to develop in a
more formal structure of organization over time as behavioral patterns and cultural
norms are used to deal with complex and uncertain situations. 233 Over time the
patterns and norms lose their connection to their original context and become
drivers of behavior in and of themselves, “fram[ing] the shared meanings, norms,
and identities.”234 Called “scripts” by one property scholar,235 these recurring
patterns of interaction limit and obscure choices.236 Over time, the resulting
rigidity and misalignments in operating procedures, rules, and structures can lead
to inefficient decisions.237
By moving towards a top-down approach to defining the permissible
norms and meaning of property, and by building the economic vision into the
constitutional theory of property, the Supreme Court is also incorporating the
scripts that produce rigidity and misalignments. The exclusion strategy, for
example, is now being used to justify the Court’s per se approach to treating all
permanent physical invasions by government as compensable takings, no matter
how small the invasion, how beneficial the invasion to the private landowner, or
how significant the public interest.238 In other words, the traditional meaning of the
exclusion strategy, with all of its advantages and weaknesses, has become part of
the constitutional history of property even though the institution of property has
228.
See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 8.
229.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
230.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Corporate Cash Con, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2011, at A19 (criticizing the idea of trickle-down economics).
231.
See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 29, 38.
232.
See Fennell, supra note 33, at 15.
233.
See Macey, supra note 226, at 884–86, 889.
234.
Id. at 905.
235.
Id. at 885–86.
236.
See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 54; see also Fennell, supra note 33, at 13–
15.
237.
See Macey, supra note 226, at 903–06 (discussing the types of script-based
transaction costs, their causes, and impacts). For a discussion of the misalignments that can
occur when the public interest is not considered in defining private rights in landed
property, see generally Sax, supra note 51.
238.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
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evolved beyond a strict exclusion strategy of sole dominion and control. The
institution of property has recognized that not all exclusion situations are equal and
that some even lead to serious inefficiency problems. Elinor Ostrom, for example,
demonstrated how the preference for exclusion and private property rights could
cause decisionmakers to ignore mixed private/public arrangements that work much
better in certain real-world settings.239 Robert Ellickson explained how community
norms among close-knit groups could lead to cooperative efforts to control
freeriding and monitor behavior.240 Michael Heller showed how having too many
property decisionmakers with the power to exclude could lead to the tragedy of the
anticommons, creating a serious collective action problem. 241 Formal structures
and organizations need the ability to look beyond their internal rules, operations,
and pathways to consider other choices. They need the ability to adapt. Human
interactions with nature have exhibited a rich variety of property arrangements and
practices. The traditional, exclusion approach to property is but one of many
alternatives.
The preference for private ordering and individual rights found in the
economic vision has also been used by the Court to impose stricter, clearer, and
more formal takings rules. In two critical decisions, the Court adopted a
categorical approach for evaluating the validity of conditions imposed in the
regulatory process under the Takings Clause. The cases announced a two-part test
to evaluate the degree of connection, under the Takings Clause, between the
condition, the public interest, and the perceived public harms caused by the
proposed use. The first test, set out in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
required government to establish an essential nexus between the regulatory
condition imposed on the landowner and a legitimate state interest being protected
by the condition.242 The second test, established in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
required government to show that a rough proportionality existed between the
regulatory condition and the projected impact of the proposed land development.243
Under these tests, the Court heightened and narrowed the standard of review, at
least for the types of regulatory conditions in dispute, to focus on “harm causation

239.
See OSTROM, supra note 198, at 12–13; Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of
Crafting Rules to Change Open Access Resources into Managed Resources 3 (Workshop in
Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. W07-11, June 28, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1304827; see also Fennell, supra
note 33, at 15–16. See generally Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of
Governing the Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 INT’L J. COMMONS 28 (2011)
(discussing the influence of Ostrom’s work on legal scholars).
240.
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 124–26 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution
Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 673–76 (1986).
241.
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 673–76 (1998). An anticommons
can arise when multiple parties have the right to exclude others from a common or shared
resource, resulting in underconsumption of the resource.
242.
483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987).
243.
512 U.S. 374, 386, 391(1994).
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and abatement.”244 Both tests assume a “singular narrative of exploitation” 245 and a
“sufficiently robust” vision of constitutionally protected property that can control
overreaching by government.246
Judicial resistance to the rules-based approach of Nollan and Dolan has
been widespread among lower courts and even among subsequent Supreme Court
decisions—at least until the Court’s 2013 decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District.247 This resistance may be due to the difficulty of
applying any single or formulistic vision of constitutional property to the complex
and variable situations involving ordinary property. 248 Clear rules generally do not
work well when a lot of variety exists. 249 In any event, the Court in Koontz
clarified that Nollan and Dolan may apply even when a permit condition involves
the payment of money250 and when a permit is denied after the applicant refuses to
transfer property.251 Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Justice Alito explained that the
key is not whether government has the power to deny a permit outright but
whether a government condition “impermissibly burden[s] the right not to have
property taken without just compensation.” 252
This problem of rigid, embedded options or scripts compounds the builtin inertia of property,253 which results in large part because of its constitutional
protection254 and increasingly because of the growing dominance of the economic
vision. The mere presence of the Takings Clause in the Constitution provides a
psychological lift to property owners, framing the way government regulations of
property are viewed even when those regulations deal with public goods or serious
problems with commons, like our global climate system. The problem of sea level
rise, for example, is now being attacked as part of an agenda to undermine
fundamental private property rights, regardless of the soundness of the science or
the reason for the rise. 255 The inertia flowing from the psychology of the Takings
244.
Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and
the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 630 (2004).
245.
Id. at 654.
246.
Id. at 652.
247.
See 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013). Compare id., with Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 539–40 (2005) (limiting application of Nollan and Dolan). For further
discussion of the consequences of takings formalism, see generally Fenster, supra note 244.
248.
See Fenster, supra note 244, at 651–54.
249.
See Poirier, supra note 165, at 124–33.
250.
See Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2603.
251.
See id. at 2595–96.
252.
Id. at 2596.
253.
One scholar has described the related problems of skewing and distortion
resulting from the signaling function of property. See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and
Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 762 (2009).
254.
See Eduardo Moises Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1095, 1133–35 (2007).
255.
See Alon Harish, New Law in North Carolina Bans Latest Scientific
Predictions of Sea-Level Rise, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/northcarolina-bans-latest-science-rising-sea-level/story?id=16913782; Rebecca Leber, Virginia
Lawmaker Says ‘Sea Level Rise’ Is a ‘Left Wing Term,’ Excises It from State Report on
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Clause impacts how government solves serious contemporary problems arising
from new environmental or socioeconomic challenges. Economic views of
property have led to repeated calls for clearer, stronger property rights, producing
categorical approaches to constitutionally protected property that increase the costs
of making changes affecting property rights even when those rights are part of the
problem being addressed.256 Though clearer property rights provide important
advantages, they are neither adaptive nor comprehensive. 257 Clarity requires
simpler thinking and rules, which in turn contributes to the problem of scriptsbased costs. Over time, the scripts lose their context and speak for themselves,
adding to the inertia and foreclosing choices.
The problem of rigid, embedded scripts also enhances the monopoly
power of property owners. Because of their decisionmaking authority over their
property, owners have the power to veto or block uses, transfers, or access to their
property.258 The monopoly power of property owners inhibits the emergence of
new property regimes, as well as the development of new patterns and scales of
use that better reflect societal interests and resource supplies.259 The common law
of property currently relies on some important checks on the monopoly power of
property owners. One important safeguard arises from interactions occurring
between the formal structure of property and informal customs and practices. To a
large extent, the common law of property has embraced those interactions,
recognizing that informal practices provide real-life context and information to fill
in the gaps and inform the meaning and operation of formal rules. 260 Without those
interactions, the institution of property would lose an important feedback loop.
Common law property also has developed a tolerance for “property outlaws,” 261
allowing some experimentation with extralegal arrangements and recognizing
devices for eventually incorporating those arrangements into the formal property

Coastal Flooding, CLIMATEPROGRESS (June 10, 2012, 6:59 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2012/06/10/496982/virginia-lawmaker-says-sea-level-rise-is-a-left-wing-termexcises-it-from-state-report-on-coastal-flooding/.
256.
See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 2.
257.
See id. at 42–45, 54–55 (explaining how clear rules pose problems); Poirier,
supra note 165, at 150–60 (extolling the virtues of vagueness).
258.
See Lee Anne Fennell, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 269, 273–74 (2007); see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
MEASURE OF PROPERTY 14–21 (2012) (attributing the monopoly power of property to the
view that the rule of law privileges property rights over other forms of law).
259.
See Carol M. Rose, Property and Emerging Environmental Issues—The
Optimists vs. The Pessimists, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 405, 417–18 (2012);
Rose, supra note 30, at 95–97.
260.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 240, at 124–26 (discussing the role of informal
norms and practices); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 24–34 (2009) (discussing the role of custom).
261.
EDUARDO MOISES PENALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS:
HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 30–32, 55–
63 (2010).
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structure under certain limited circumstances. 262 These extralegal arrangements
give us important information about the formal property system, helping to
encourage discourse about the arrangements, identify market problems, and, when
compelling reasons have been presented, overcome political inertia. 263
The checks allowed by common law property are important because
property does not have an effective built-in monitoring system, other than its
incremental, precedent-guided decisionmaking process that occurs at the margin.
An internal monitoring system exists when a system’s rules, principles, and
processes cause the system to identify cheating and other performance problems
and to self-correct. Property lacks a monitoring system because of its inherent
promotion of self interest, its almost single-minded focus on allocation of interests,
its failure to deal adequately with distribution of property interests, and its limited,
micro-level approach to the management function of property. Without a
monitoring system, property would not have a way to deal with one of its
fundamental moral problems: property’s lack of disinterestedness, one of the key
norms enhancing a system’s moral authority. 264 Because private property rights are
inherently self-promoting265 (and are even assumed to be so under the economic
vision), property needs external checks to serve as monitoring systems and to push
for correction and adaptation. Those systems preferably will have some
redundancy to increase the chances of identifying errors and ensure effective
checking. These monitoring systems help to give the institution of property some
sense of moral authority and acceptance.266 If the economic vision of property
continues to take over the constitutional theory of property, the checks on common
law property and its overall resilience will be in danger.

262.
Id. at 125–65. Hernando de Soto uses the phrase “extralegal arrangements”
in his book on The Mystery of Capital. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL
108 (2000). In that book he identifies extralegal arrangements as an important distinction
between our property law system and those of developing countries. Id. at 106–10.
American property law learned how to incorporate extralegals into the system gradually
and, in the process, strengthened its capitalist market. Id. at 148–50. Examples of such
devices include adverse possession, mistaken improver, and prescriptive rights. See id. at
113–35.
263.
See PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 261, at 125–42.
264.
Disinterestedness means a freedom from bias and self-interest. Inherently
self-promoting, our system of private property lacks such impartiality. Cf. ROBERT K.
MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 275–
77 (1973) (describing disinterestedness and three other moral principles governing scientific
inquiry). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1849, 1849–52 (2007) (arguing that property has a moral core tied to its
exclusion rights).
265.
See Rose, supra note 30, at 93–94.
266.
For further discussion of the moral authority of property, see Merrill &
Smith, supra note 264; Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1897 (2007).
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2. The Importance of Resilience
An effectively functioning property system needs resilience to adapt, to
self-correct, to make the adjustments needed to handle changing socioeconomic,
cultural, political, and biophysical conditions. Property needs resilience to avoid
the problems caused by the coupling of the economic vision of property and the
constitutional theory of property. Because of property’s built-in inertia, its inherent
monopoly power, its embedded options with their individualistic focus, and its
lack of an effective internal monitoring system, we cannot afford to let our
property system lose its resilience. It is only with a resilient system that we will get
the back-and-forth, give-and-take, adjustments and readjustments—the dialectical
and adaptive interactions—needed to handle the changes and the surprises that are
inevitable.
Any perspective that thinks of property solely or mainly as a human
system ignores important cross-system interactions and dependencies. Inherent in
the very definition of property is an in rem relationship between the property
owner and a resource (often physical) that has implications for the rest of the
world. To the extent that the creation or use of property involves natural resources,
the property relationship depends on those resources at least in the short term to
thrive,267 and third parties are likely to be excluded from those resources or
adversely affected by the relationship at some point in time. Property also is a
subsystem of the larger, self-organizing natural system, and actions within the
property system resonate as inputs and feedbacks, affecting the larger system’s
ability to self-adjust to change through interactions among its components.
Property, in other words, is closely intertwined with our natural environment, and
the resilience of our property system is closely tied to the resilience of natural
systems. It is time to reorient our property system within the larger system
framework and assume that the larger system reflects processes and interactions
that we do not yet fully understand.
The concept of resilience is very important to the management of
ecological systems.268 Scientists have used ecological resilience in at least two
different ways. When the focus is the predictability and constancy of a particular
equilibrium state, scientists have defined ecological resilience as the ability to
return to that equilibrium state after a disturbance.269 If more than one stable or
equilibrium state is assumed, then ecological resilience may be “measured by the
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system redefines its
267.
In the long term, this dependency may turn on society by failing to account
for serious harmful spillovers. See Rose, supra note 30, at 93 (discussing how property
systems evolve in times of abundance and scarcity).
268.
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Protecting a Natural Resource Legacy While
Promoting Resilience: Can It Be Done?, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1024 (2009) (discussing the
value of the resilience concept in informing a new approach to environmental law and
policy). See generally BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING (2006)
(discussing the importance of resilience thinking to environmental management).
269.
See Lance Gunderson, Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management—
Antidotes for Spurious Certitude?, 3 CONSERVATION ECOL. No. 1, art. 7 (1999).
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structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior.”270 The
resilience of the ecosystem thus would depend on its ability to cope or adapt to
changes, whether abrupt or gradual. 271 Understood as “forcings,” these changes
may affect the system’s stable equilibrium state, causing reactions that cascade
throughout the system and subsystems and sometimes even result in a new system
state or regime with a different trajectory of evolution in space and time. 272 When
an ecosystem is unable to handle the changes and flips to another system state, the
new state will have different structural and functional characteristics that may alter
species’ composition and provide different ecosystem services. 273 The crises could
include unexpected changes in a locality caused by larger-scale processes that are
not familiar to the local population, cross-scale surprises produced by the
interaction of larger-scale processes and variables internal to the affected area, and
novel surprises produced by new processes, factors, or states. 274 Ensuring that
ecosystems are resilient enough to deal with these changes is thus an integral part
of modern management efforts.275
For decades scientists have been studying the management of natural
systems by examining the dynamics of change in social–ecological systems. This
focus on interactions among social and ecological systems recognizes that
ecosystem management must take into account human intervention and integrate
social with ecological goals. A social–ecological system is a multidisciplinary
model of interactions among ecological and social components occurring at
multiple levels and “emphasizes the ‘humans-in-nature’ perspective” integrating
ecosystems and human society.276 Just as ecosystems tend to go through different
stages of an adaptive cycle, social–ecological systems also have different phases of
change.277 Understanding the change dynamics of a social–ecological system can
provide insights into the timing and nature of effective management decisions of
key governance institutions (like property) that link ecological and social systems.
Rigid management systems, for example, may make decisions that can alter the
space–time trajectory of the ecological systems. The disastrous ecological changes
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
See WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at 53–55, 59, 85–87. See generally
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2002) (analyzing the
evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium).
273.
See LANCE GUNDERSON ET AL., ASSESSING RESILIENCE IN SOCIAL–
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: WORKBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 5 (2.0 version, 2010), available at
http://www.redagres.org/Assessing%20Resilience%20in%20Social-Ecological%20Systems.
pdf; WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at 93–94.
274.
See Gunderson, supra note 269, at 2–3.
275.
Earlier approaches to natural resource management focused on making those
resources usable (e.g., cutting trees or draining wetlands) and controlling various
characteristics of those resources (e.g., installing levees for flood control). See WALKER &
SALT, supra note 268, at x–xi, 29–30; Butler, supra note 40, at 943–47.
276.
GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 6; see also WALKER & SALT, supra note 268,
at 31–36.
277.
See GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 7, 22–23; WALKER & SALT, supra note
268, at 74–87.
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resulting in the Dust Bowl provide excellent evidence of the altering of space–time
trajectories because of a one-dimensional vision of property. Instead of seeing the
stability provided by the complex alliances of the plains’ biological and physical
systems, landowners simply saw fields of grass waiting to be plowed. 278 When the
coupled social or governance system lacks flexibility and is locked in time,
adaptive management of ecological systems generally does not work. 279
Research on complex social–ecological systems provides a framework for
thinking about effective management strategies, including property regimes. That
research highlights the complex and uncertain nature of ecological systems and of
their interactions with social systems. 280 To handle the uncertainty and complexity,
decisionmakers must have the power to manage for resilience. This requires the
flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, enough diversity in the social–
ecological systems to stabilize and function after a disturbance, and sufficient
redundancy of systems to cover loss of important functions or damage to
components.281 Management approaches are more likely to achieve long-term
success if they recognize the importance of understanding the “dynamics of
change,” as opposed to controlling the ecosystem for specific goals like short-term
gain or maximum production. 282 In this context, “success” involves governance of
“relationships between society and ecosystems in ways that sustain ecosystem
services”283 while promoting social goals. By understanding the dynamics of
change within social–ecological systems, management efforts can focus on
allowing interactions that lead to adjustments or create “opportunities for
recovering or reorganizing following a disturbance.” 284 Treating social–ecological
systems holistically focuses attention on how the parts contribute to the dynamics
of the whole, not simply on acquiring a “detailed understanding” of each part. 285
The abilities to adjust, to self-organize, and to interact are important aspects of
resilient social–ecological systems.286 These functions require adaptive
management that encourages diversity, flexibility, inclusiveness, and innovation. 287
Using the lens of adaptive governance concepts developed for social–
ecological systems, the resilience of property refers to the ability of a property
278.
For a poignant description of this ecological disaster, see WORSTER, supra
note 204, at 182.
279.
See Gunderson, supra note 269, at 2; WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at
69–72, 85–87.
280.
See GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 4; WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at
31–36.
281.
See WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at 34–35, 59–63, 69–72, 145–48; see
also Flournoy, supra note 268, at 1024. See generally WALKER & SALT, supra note 268
(discussing ecosystems crossing thresholds).
282.
GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 4; see also WALKER & SALT, supra note 268,
at 28–38.
283.
GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 8.
284.
Id. at 6.
285.
Id.; see also WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at 31–36.
286.
See GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 6.
287.
See id. at 8; WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at 69–72, 145–48.
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system to absorb change and still thrive or persist—the capacity of the property
system to handle disturbances without becoming too unstable to function
effectively or without tipping over into a new property (and behavioral) regime.
Functions critical to a resilient property system would include the ability to adjust
or adapt, the capacity to interact with ecological and other systems to identify
changing conditions and problems, and the power to self-organize and respond to
change. A resilient property system thus would need to encourage flexibility to
respond to change, innovation to develop methods of adaptation, inclusiveness to
consider external forces and integrate external options, diversity to provide
alternative paths and options for property arrangements, and redundancy to insure
against the losses of key functions or components. 288
What types of changes or disruptions would a property system need to
absorb or handle over time? The changes could include local or cross-scale events
that arise from larger-scale processes like sudden changes in Supreme Court
decisions governing constitutionally protected property. 289 A Supreme Court
decision, for example, that suddenly shifts from a balancing test to a categorical
approach in evaluating government action under the Takings Clause or that finds
clarity in the historical compact of the Takings Clause when reasonable minds
disagree could disrupt state and local governments; they understandably could be
relying on the grayness of prior law or on their longstanding power to define
property as a matter of state law.290 Supreme Court decisions that limit how state
courts may define background principles of their own common law to that of a
certain time or source also could disrupt state and local governments. 291 The
changes could include cross-scale surprises resulting from interactions of largerscale processes and internal variables. For instance, changes in federal laws
288.
See GUNDERSON, supra note 273, at 8; WALKER & SALT, supra note 268, at
69–72, 145–48.
289.
Changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence could be due to a number of
factors—for example, a change in the composition of the Court. See, e.g., Scott R. Meinke
& Kevin M. Scott, Collegial Influence and Judicial Voting Change: The Effect of
Membership Change on U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 909, 909–12
(2007).
290.
Scalia’s statements in Stop the Beach Renourishment and Lucas about the
clarity of the historical compact or meaning of the Takings Clause are arguably examples of
the second situation. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S.Ct. 2592, 2606 (2010) (plurality opinion); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015–18 (1992). Some would also view the Court’s shift in Lucas from a factor
balancing test to a per se approach to economic regulation as an example of the first,
especially given the language in Mahon about the necessity of ad hoc inquiries. Compare
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–18, 1027–29 (taking a categorical approach whenever a regulation
denies all economically beneficial use unless preexisting background principles exist), with
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (using a factor
balancing approach for regulatory takings), and Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922) (stating that the matter of a confiscatory regulation is a “question of degree” that
“cannot be resolved by general propositions).
291.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (directing the state court to “identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in
the circumstances in which the property is presently found”).
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governing regulatory takings risk analysis292 could conflict with physical
conditions in particular areas, suddenly making management efforts to deal with
serious resource or ecological crises very difficult or prohibitively expensive.
Those same changes could conflict with the social or economic conditions of a
particular place, like serious inequalities in the distribution of affordable housing,
effectively preventing localized solutions. Local disruptions could arise from rigid
adherence to traditional interpretations of the right to exclude in the
landlord/tenant setting without consideration of an area’s housing or worker
conditions, effectively depriving classes of people of fundamental legal rights or of
habitable premises.293 Novel changes most often result from advances in
technology; the invention of the airplane, for instance, posed an unanticipated
change for traditional courts defining land ownership rights under the ad coelum
doctrine as extending up to the heavens and down to the depths of the earth. 294
What features of a property system would promote its resilience? A good
starting point is the variety or diversity that currently exists in the American
property system. Because the states have always had the power to define, develop,
and regulate property within their jurisdictions, 295 our institution of property has a
diversity of approaches built into it. At least 50 different property “experiments”
are being conducted, perhaps more if local courts and legislative bodies are
considered. Had the allocation of power over the development of property law
been handled differently and had the federal government been given authority over
all matters involving property, the experimentation among the state and local
governments now occurring would not be possible. This experimentation allows
states to test different approaches to natural resource and social problems
involving property and to tailor solutions to local conditions. If the Supreme Court
preempts some of this power over property by continuing to intertwine the
economic vision of everyday property with constitutionally protected property, the

292.
See Protecting the Property Rights of the American People, Exec. Order No.
13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 28, 2006); see also Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of
Takings: Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 780–802
(1997) (discussing the impact of takings impact assessments under a predecessor, Exec.
Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989)).
293.
For examples of courts refusing to take such a rigid approach, see Javins v.
First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing the need to
reform traditional landlord/tenant principles to include a landlord’s obligation to maintain
habitable premises); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–74 (N.J. 1971) (defining the right to
exclude in a more flexible way to balance the conflicting rights of a landowner and the
migrant workers residing on his land).
294.
See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (resolving
a claim that plane flights posed a physical invasion violating the landowner’s right to
exclude from the airspace above his land, as recognized under the ad coelum doctrine, by
revising the doctrine to accommodate technological advances like airplane flight).
295.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130
S.Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010).
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ability to experiment—to diversify and develop alternative paths—could be
significantly limited.296
The common law decisionmaking process underlying the development of
property law also provides much needed flexibility. With its incremental
decisionmaking approach, common law property has the ability to adapt more
easily, at least at the margin, than a legislatively or constitutionally mandated
system; even when a change in the common law of property occurs, the amount of
the change tends to be smaller in scope and more tied to the facts of the dispute.
For centuries courts have recognized the ability of the common law of property to
adapt, to grow, to consider new information, and to meet changing conditions or
needs.297 When developed areas became more crowded, for example, courts
gradually changed the tests for determining whether a trespass or private nuisance
existed; because of conditions on the ground, courts reconsidered and recalibrated
the standards and rules defining the nature and scope of property rights. 298 The
courts also have developed property doctrines, like accretion, avulsion, and
erosion, that are inherently flexible, making the choice of property rule and
resolution of the dispute dependent on the nature of the shifting physical
conditions underlying the dispute. For example, whereas the doctrines of erosion
and accretion govern the allocation of title when slow, imperceptible changes are
occurring to coastal land, the doctrine of avulsion applies when the changes are
sudden and rapid.299
In recent years some judges and commentators have become increasingly
vocal about the need to limit property’s flexibility when constitutional principles
are involved. Scholars, for example, have criticized those who favor an ad hoc,
balancing approach over a more rigid categorical one, pointing to the benefits of
crystalline rules over muddy standards.300 They also have stressed the need for
296.
For discussions of the federalism implications of takings law, see generally
Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1681 (2007), and Sterk, supra note 209.
297.
See generally Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934); Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 249–55, 262–64 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Javins,
428 F.2d at 1074–79; Hinman, 84 F.2d at 758; Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187–91
(Wis. 1982). But see infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia’s views,
expressed in Stop the Beach Renourishment, that early common law courts did not have the
power to change property law).
298.
See, e.g., Hinman, 84 F.2d at 758; Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, 555–
56 (Va. 2007) (redefining ownership rights under the ad coelum doctrine to reject an
absolute rights perspective and changing from a noxious plant test to a harm test).
299.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2598–99; Nebraska v.
Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.26 (A. Casner ed.,
1952).
300.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Decisions of Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor: When Pragmatic Balancing Is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 177, 177–80 (2012). But see Poirier, supra note 165, at 150–51
(discussing the benefits of vague, muddy rules). See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (discussing the differences between
muddy and clear approaches in property law).

2013]

RESILIENCE OF PROPERTY

897

adherence to what they see as the founding fathers’ clear vision of property. 301
Similarly, in several cases involving takings challenges, Supreme Court Justices
have suggested that property’s ability to evolve—its elasticity—should be limited
by what they see as a clear historical compact underlying the Takings Clause
specifically and property’s constitutional role more generally. 302 In his majority
opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia was careful to
circumscribe common law property’s ability to handle changing conditions,
limiting it to preexisting background principles in the common law of property and
nuisance.303 Never mind that state legislative bodies have also played a role in
developing property and regulating its spillovers. Never mind that such a time-and
source-bound approach is impoverished by a lack of contemporary knowledge of
the landscape scale of ecosystems. Never mind that such an approach basically
rules out regulations aimed at long-term environmental or social harms, especially
those suffered by future generations, cumulative in nature, or intensified by other
conditions. Never mind that the regulations may be dealing with harm that arises
indirectly and decades after interactions with other systems. In his dissent to a
denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, Justice Scalia confirmed
the restrictiveness of his preexisting background principles approach when he
issued a warning about a state court’s interpretation of its common law of
property; Joined by Justice O’Connor, he proclaimed that a state court could not
invoke “nonexistent rules of state substantive law,” nor retroactively develop and
apply background principles that define away property rights as if they never
existed.304
In his opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, Justice Scalia provided further explanation. 305 In Stop
the Beach Renourishment, the Court faced the question of whether a judicial
interpretation of property principles could constitute a taking. The Florida
Supreme Court had interpreted its common law of property to allow the state to fill
in its own seabed and restore beaches eroded by several hurricanes, even though
the beach restoration added about 75 feet of dry sand between privately owned
beachfront property and the water. The Florida court reasoned that the restoration
resulted from sudden exposure of previously submerged lands, which belonged to
the sovereign state under its common law. 306 By concluding that the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision “did not contravene the established property rights” of
beachfront landowners,307 a majority of the Supreme Court was able to sidestep the
question of a judicial taking. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was consistent with its background

301.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, More Fidelity, Less Translation: A Loyalist’s
Response to Professor Treanor, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 185, 187–88 (1998).
302.
See infra notes 303–14 and accompanying text.
303.
See 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
304.
510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
305.
See 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
306.
See id. at 2598–99.
307.
Id. at 2613.
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principles of property law. 308 Elsewhere, however, in a section joined only by
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Scalia soundly rejected the argument
that common law judges need flexibility in defining property rights and resolving
property disputes.309 He explained that the argument “has little appeal when
directed against the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee adopted in an era
when . . . courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.” 310 In his view “courts
have no peculiar need of flexibility”—no more than legislators.311 Disagreeing
with Justice Kennedy’s view that the common law allows for incremental change,
Justice Scalia stressed that when the Constitution was adopted, “courts had no
power to ‘change’ the common law.” 312 Further, even after they assumed this
power in the nineteenth century, the “new ‘common-law tradition . . . [did not
allow] for incremental modifications to property law.’” 313 At most, all courts could
do was “clarify and elaborate” on the meaning of common law property. 314
This more crystalline and more rigid approach to constitutional and thus
common law property ignores a fundamental difference between the two. Common
law property developed slowly over time through a dialectical process that
evaluates property’s rules, standards, and policies in light of societal and
biophysical conditions. In handling property disputes under the common law,
courts generally recognize that they can consider new information, emerging
technologies, and changing conditions.315 The muddiness of common law property,
in other words, encourages dialogue and inclusion of ideas. 316 Part of that dialogue
involves the emergence of extralegal arrangements that challenge the status quo
and question current rules. The common law’s tolerance for informal norms and
“property outlaws” makes the property system more inclusive and open. 317 These
norms, customs, and outlaw arrangements provide invaluable information about
how property operates in the real world and about alternative approaches. They
identify the pressure points within the property system—areas where property is
not working well and where adjustments are needed. 318 They tell property owners
where the paths of cooperation and neighborliness are and, through those paths,
soften the harsh edges of the formal property system. Takings law does not have
308.
See id. at 2612.
309.
See id. at 2606–07, 2609 (plurality opinion).
310.
Id. at 2609 (plurality opinion).
311.
Id.
312.
Compare id. at 2613–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring), with id. at 2606 (plurality
opinion). Justice Kennedy disagreed, maintaining that state courts “operate under a
common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law” and that
the general constraint on this power is the due process clause. Id. at 2613–15 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
313.
Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
314.
Id. at 2609 (plurality opinion).
315.
See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text.
316.
See Poirier, supra note 165, at 150–55.
317.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 240, at 124–26 (discussing the role of informal
norms and practices); Penalver & Katyal, supra note 254, at 1164–65 (discussing the role of
outlaw arrangements); Smith, supra note 260, at 6 (discussing the role of custom).
318.
See Fennell, supra note 258, at 271.
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any paths of cooperation or tradition of neighborly relations in the eminent domain
setting. No cooperative relationship can exist when government is forcing property
owners to give up their property. No informal norms can be found in takings law to
soften its hard edge. That absence is precisely why common law property needs to
maintain its built-in flexibility and have the ability to rely on informal
“relationship-preserving norms” to promote cooperation within the community. 319
Checks on a system are very important to its resilience. Because property
lacks an effective internal monitoring system,320 those checks must include the
existence of feedback loops or avenues of communication, as well as the tolerance
for informal norms and outlaw arrangements discussed earlier. Because of the
impact of mainstream economics on property law, individual property owners may
lack the necessary incentives to manage their property for resilience. Checks on
the property system help to correct that problem by providing information about
the system’s operation and about conditions within which it operates. Information
must flow back to those reevaluating property principles to enable the system to
identify problems and pressure points. Custom, informal norms, and outlaw
arrangements all act as feedback loops. Equity also acts as an important check on
property, prompting—even demanding—change for the sake of fairness.321
Without the constraint of equity, in particular, property probably would lack even a
second-best moral authority to justify its effects on individual and collective
interests.322 The categorical approaches and time-restricted visions of property
impede, if not eliminate, the exercise of discretion, the reliance on informal norms,
and the consideration of new information and conditions.
The features that make property resilient and the checks that allow it to
self-correct would not function effectively if property’s evolutionary process were
not fluid and dynamic. The next Section discusses the dialectic process and
relational planes that have shaped the evolution of property.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCESS AND
RELATIONAL PLANES
Scholars have advanced a number of theories to explain the evolution of
property.323 Demsetz, for example, posited that property rights develop in response
to costs and benefits,324 while Coase famously observed that high transaction costs
319.
Lisa Bernstein provided invaluable insights about the differences between
“relationship-preserving norms” and “end-game norms” in the context of contract law. See
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796–1814 (1996).
320.
See supra notes 263–66 and accompanying text.
321.
See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236–40 (1918);
Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Building Co., 333 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. App.
1960).
322.
See Rose, supra note 266, at 1899–900. But cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note
264, at 1849–52 (arguing that property has a moral core tied to its exclusion rights).
323.
For discussions of different theories, see Krier, supra note 30, at 145–46,
149; Rose, supra note 30, at 94–95.
324.
See Demsetz, supra note 30, at 347.
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could affect the cost-benefit calculus and should be considered in determining
where to place the entitlement or property right. 325 Locke linked the establishment
of property rights to rewarding labor, 326 and Hume theorized that behavioral
conventions spontaneously arose from shared interests, leading to recognition of
property rights as protection against exploitation. 327 Many contemporary law
professors agree that the efficiency norm is the key to an effective property
system.328 Some also recognize the role of informal norms in the evolution of
property.329 These theories help to define and test key perspectives that have
shaped societies and their property regimes. Regardless of the theory of evolution
subscribed to property, it is clear that the formation of property rights has involved
a dialectical process that has helped to preserve the resilience of our property
system. That process needs to continue if the institution of property is to handle the
tough problems of tomorrow.
Part III.A discusses the nature, functions, and limitations of the dialectical
process shaping property’s evolution. Part III.B focuses on the relational planes of
property: the planes of interacting perspectives that define the property landscape,
or all the possible property arrangements in relation to particular perspective-based
preferences.
A. The Nature, Functions, and Limitations of the Dialectical Process
To say common law property developed through a dialectical process is
to acknowledge the complexities of a property system in a pluralistic society.330
Those complexities arise from competing visions of property and of its
relationship with political, economic, social, and natural systems. Common law
property handled the complexities and tensions through a dialectical process of
give-and-take, adjustment and readjustment, debate and deliberation about
property’s role, norms, policies, and functions. 331 By its very nature, the common
325.
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13–19, 27–
28 (1960).
326.
See LOCKE, supra note 126, at ch. 5. For contemporary critiques of Locke’s
views on property, see Eric R. Claeys, Productive Use in Acquisition, Accession, and
Labour Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (James E. Penner &
Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming Jan. 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2066166; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254–91 (1990); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 137–252 (1988).
327.
See Krier, supra note 30, at 145–46, 150–51.
328.
See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 53, at 18–19; Richard A. Epstein, The
Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 528–33
(2002).
329.
See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 240, at 124–26; Smith, supra note 260, at
7–10.
330.
See Poirier, supra note 165, at 124–30 (discussing the complexities of
property).
331.
Other scholars have also discussed the evolution of property in terms of
dialectics, especially the development of constitutional property. See, e.g., Alexander, supra
note 38, at 261–62; Fennell, supra note 226, at 260 (describing how property is the result of
an “iterative process”); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
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law resolves property conflicts incrementally through a process of reasoned
deliberation one case at a time—at the margin—while maintaining its stability at
the core. Even when the legislature has stepped in to resolve conflicts more
comprehensively, the common law still controls much of the process of reform,
defining the issues and conflicting interests as well as the legal principles at play.
In some ways property is, as one scholar put it, “a never-ending dispute.”332
Elinor Ostrom’s work, in particular, provides evidence of this dialectical
process in operation and helps to explain the fluid way property has evolved. Her
work shows how property arrangements draw from real-life practices for the
cultural, ecological, and behavioral details to make the theory work. 333 Her
methodology involves “moving back and forth from the world of theory to the
world of action”334 and identifying institutional features that produce successful
systems over the long term.335 As Fennell aptly explained, Ostrom’s working
principle was: “A resource arrangement that works in practice can work in
theory.”336
The sources of the tensions or surprises that affect the efficacy of a
property system and guide its evolution are varied. The tensions and surprises may
come from informal norms, customs, and practices happening on the ground
despite—or in the absence of—a formal arrangement.337 They may reflect
changing social or biophysical conditions that threaten the viability of some or all
of the current system or that question its continued legitimacy. They may result
from the emergence of a new ideology, perspective, technology, or understanding
that demands readjustment in property’s formal rules or structure. 338
The dialectical process enables our property system to handle these
tensions and unexpected events. Interactions occurring through the process act as a
check on any one view or theory becoming so extreme, excessive, or dominating
that the efficacy of the system is challenged. The dialectical process also performs
a corrective function, allowing the system to identify and address problems,
ineffective arrangements, or outdated rules. Without the possibility of adjustments,
pressure points would be ignored until too late. The process opens the property
system to consideration of different views, making property more inclusive and
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1324–29, 1349–50 (1987); Poirier,
supra note 165, at 160–61, 186–90. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory
Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence—an Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV.
577 (1990) (discussing the evolution of property and regulatory regimes).
332.
Poirier, supra note 165, at 190.
333.
See Fennell, supra note 33, at 9–12.
334.
OSTROM, supra note 198, at 45.
335.
See Fennell, supra note 33, at 9–10, 21–22.
336.
Id. at 10.
337.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 240, at 124–26 (describing how society punishes
or rewards certain behaviors based on their comportment with certain norms).
338.
New advancements in telecommunications and the Internet, for example,
continue to raise questions about how or whether to recognize property rights. See, e.g.,
James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2799–
801 (2010).
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thus more varied—important features of a resilient system.339 Calls for greater
clarity in defining property rights would, if taken as far as urged, undermine
property’s ability to have this dialogue. 340 The functions of checking, adjustment,
and inclusion all are important to protecting and promoting the resilience of
property. They ensure that property is viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism,
using tension, disagreement, and debate to flush out issues and point to needed
reform.
The dialectical process admittedly has some limitations. Though the
process may provide the most realistic assessment of how property evolves, the
process embraces the complexities of property in an open-ended, almost infinite
way. Most people have enough difficulty dealing with one or two variables, much
less a seemingly endless supply. Economic and other theories of property tend to
control real-world complexities by focusing only on a few variables, assuming
away or holding the others constant. 341 A focus on the dialectical process does not
allow for such assumptions. As Poirier pointed out in the context of constitutional
property, it is difficult to think in terms of such an “unbounded process.” 342
It is also difficult to talk about property as a constantly changing concept,
on the one hand, and a source of stability, on the other. This type of talk puts
property theorists in a “double bind” by claiming the importance of permanence
while facing the reality of constant change. 343 Yet true permanence in property
would require an unwavering commitment to a limited number of foundational
values and an adherence to clear rules that would belie the history of our property
system and the pluralist nature of our society. 344 Such permanence would “petrify
property”345 and undermine its resilience. Such permanence would require an
agreement on those foundational values that would exclude, by design, conflicting
values and visions, very likely because of political or moral ideology. 346
The incremental approach of common law decisionmaking, when
combined with the tension-driven nature of the dialectical process, produces much
uncertainty and back-and-forth. To those who prefer clarity and the quick path to a
339.
As Nestor Davidson observed, property law “eschews singular
narratives . . . , focusing instead on the varied and often competing normative and
instrumental concerns embodied in the institution.” Davidson, supra note 161, at 1600.
340.
See Poirier, supra note 165, at 186–87.
341.
Economics, for example, assumes everyone is a rational actor, that more is
better than less, and that all preferences have a monetary equivalence. See supra note 173
and accompanying text.
342.
Poirier, supra note 165, at 190.
343.
Id. at 187–88; see Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of
Property, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 167–69, 191–92 (1996).
344.
See Poirier, supra note 165, at 188–90.
345.
Id. at 189.
346.
See id. at 116–17 (discussing the political difficulties of implementing clear
rules about takings); see also Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV.
277, 308–15 (1998) (providing examples of proponents of republicanism who moved
toward a more egalitarian version of the theory based on what was more popularly
acceptable).
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certain end state, this leaves much to be desired. The problem is intensified in the
constitutional setting when constitutional principles start off at the wrong place
with the wrong set of legal rules and norms, producing a much longer period of
constitutional harm. As Richard Epstein observed, a slow entrenchment on
property rights under an incremental process is nevertheless an entrenchment
producing harm.347 Missteps or errors in common law property decisions, of
course, can be cured by legislative action. A legislature’s hands are tied to a
greater extent with constitutional property, but even here legislative action still
may be able to provide greater protection to property rights in certain settings. 348
Further, the calls for clarity in common law and constitutional property assume a
universality of foundational principles that simply defies the evolutionary history
and complexity of both. Such calls assume that property exists in a world of
simplicity. Yet the path of evolution rarely is easy or certain.
Though the dialectical process poses problems for the management of
property and the predictability of property arrangements, that process is critical to
preserving the resilience of property. If that process is halted, if it is misdirected or
contained, if it is misunderstood as undermining investment in property
arrangements, property will lose its ability to evolve, to change, to deal with new
conditions, problems, and challenges. If, instead, that process is allowed to
continue, property will have the flexibility to handle those new problems and
challenges by modernizing internal norms, redefining functions, or recognizing
new relational perspectives. Part III.B explores some of the relational perspectives
shaping property.
B. A More Comprehensive View of Property’s Relational Planes
A number of key perspectives affect the evolution of property. When the
continuum of possible property arrangements interacts with one of these
perspectives, a relational plane defining the possible interactions between the
property arrangements and the perspective-based preferences can be imagined. As
more relational planes are added, the institution of property can be thought of as a
series of stacked or rotating planes, with the x-axis of each plane always
representing the continuum of possible property arrangements and the y-axis
representing a continuum of preferences tied to a particular perspective. The
dialectical process would move the institution of property among the different
quadrants of a plane and among the different perspective-based planes, depending
on the nature and resolution of conflicts and tensions. The image of a series of
stacked or rotating planes would better reflect what the landscape of property
resembles (or could resemble) because of the different value preferences

347.
See Epstein, supra note 300, at 181–83.
348.
Indeed, after the Court’s decision in Kelo, many state legislatures adopted
statutes that defined public use under their state constitutions to exclude economic
development. See, e.g., Mihaly & Smith, supra note 6, at 707–08. See generally DANA
BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE POST-KELO WORLD
(2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgates-report.pdf
(discussing how courts and legislatures reacted to the Kelo decision).

904

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:847

represented by each plane and the complex interactions within and among the
planes.
Why is the image of a plane and of a series of planes so important? The
image gets us out of dichotomous, either/or thinking, away from choosing between
different end states and perspectives and toward a focus on interactions and more
complex possibilities. The image is important because of the relationship between
the institution of property and a number of key perspectives. Property, for
example, is fundamentally linked to a country’s political system, expressing and
shaping core political values, and to the generation of wealth in its economic
system. Property is linked to the social and cultural systems, which provide the
humanistic details that can make or break the property system, and to natural
systems that both provide vital inputs but also set limits on future growth. 349 To
recognize only one perspective would deny the importance of other perspectives to
the evolution of property and could eventually lead to its destabilization. The
recognition of key relational planes of property allows for a check on any
particular perspective and builds in redundancy to ensure that property issues
affecting the viability of human and natural systems are being examined from
different perspectives.
Property scholarship has focused on a number of these relational planes in
relative isolation. Much of that scholarship has forcefully made the case for the
correctness of a particular perspective and sometimes even shown how that
perspective accounts for and integrates other perspectives. Perhaps the best
example of such scholarship advances the economic theory of property as the most
likely explanation of property’s evolution and as the best justification for its
continued existence.350 This scholarship has been an invaluable part of the process
of thinking about property’s role in a modern society and has pushed the
development of the economic theory of property from a single, one-way view of
property’s evolution (from commons to private property) to theories of multiple
dimensions.351 Now that the economic perspective has begun to affect and control
the definition of constitutionally protected property, it is time to focus on the
impact of that perspective on the resilience of property and on property’s other
relational planes.
One of those other relational planes involves the relationship between
property arrangements and preferences for natural systems. The property–nature
plane shown earlier provides a visual of two continua of interacting preferences as
349.
See Rose, supra note 30, at 95–97. Greg Alexander has described takings law
discourse as always dialectical, not linear or static, because of its ongoing social dialectic
about the degree of responsibility an individual member owes to the community. See
Alexander, supra note 38, at 262.
350.
See supra notes 30–32, 188–202 and accompanying text.
351.
Compare Demsetz, supra note 30, at 350 (focusing on the single, one-way
path), with Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open
Access Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 78–79 (2009) (discussing three
dimensions of property). See generally Krier, supra note 30 (discussing different theories of
the origin and evolution of property rights).
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a way to break the spell of dichotomous thinking and either/or end-state ideals.
This Section now builds on that single plane image to propose an N-dimensional
model of property, where N represents the number of distinct, independent,
perspective-based preferences or variables. For example, another type of relational
plane involves the relationship between property and political systems. Here the
set of possible property arrangements would interact with the set of possible
political arrangements, ranging from a preference for an extensive regulatory state
to a laissez-faire approach.352 Considering the dynamics between the plane’s
continua or axes helps to identify and highlight the range of possible preferences in
a way that better reflects the relational complexities of humans, their property, and
their government. Focusing only on the ends of each continuum instead results in a
clash of end-state ideals that become oversimplified myths of the property–
government dynamic.353 In the context of this dynamic, those myths could be
summarized as: (1) property as evil (reflecting the end-state preferences for
collective public rights and an extensive regulatory state); (2) property as good, as
the centerpiece of a productive life (reflecting the end-state preferences for
individual private property rights and limited, laissez-faire government); (3)
property as vacillating between good and evil (reflecting the end-state preferences
for an extensive regulatory state or individual private property rights, depending on
the context); and (4) property as capricious and unpredictable (reflecting the endstate preferences for collective public rights and limited, laissez-faire
government).354 The problem with these myths is that they do not even begin to
capture the complexities of real-life situations or of possible individual
preferences, and they ignore other relational planes. Though my N-dimensional
model of property is much more complex than a one- or two-dimensional model,
those who advocate for one perspective (and thus one relational plane) are grossly
overselling and overestimating the power of their view.
A brief discussion of the evolution of land distribution laws demonstrates
how property arrangements go back and forth between continua and relational
planes. In feudal England, land was the main source of wealth and means of
control over society. Feudal laws governing allocation and distribution of interests
in land became tools for shaping the political, agricultural, social, tax, and military
systems.355 The allocation of property interests was incidental to the support and

352.
Somewhere on that continuum, for instance, would lay the “communitybased democratic resolutions of property use.” Poirier, supra note 165, at 186.
353.
For examples of some myths of property ownership, see Eric T. Freyfogle,
Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 279, 286–
303 (1998).
354.
These oversimplified end-state ideals or myths are adaptations of John
Adams’s model for studying individual response to risk and uncertainty. See JOHN ADAMS,
RISK 40–41 (1995); see also MARK MASLIN, GLOBAL WARMING: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 36–42 (2004) (discussing Adams’s four myths of nature in the context of
global warming).
355.
See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
(4th ed., 2002) (discussing the development of feudalism and the English legal system).
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operation of these systems.356 In its prime, the feudal system reflected a preference
for top-down control of the allocation of property interests by the Crown. 357
Though private interests existed, the top-down approach allowed government to
affect those interests with a sort of “public” or government interest (defined in this
context as the interests of the Crown) by imposing conditions and restrictions
designed to protect and promote the feudal system and its functions. 358 The masses
of people who did not receive any private property interests sometimes
participated in an open-field system of agriculture involving a mix of lands worked
in common for their lord as well as assigned plots. 359 The property–government
and property–social systems planes dominated the definition and evolution of
property during this period.
In America, survival and economic development dominated land
distribution laws soon after the first settlement in Jamestown. Because of the vast,
untapped natural resources of America, much work had to be done to establish a
thriving colony; land distribution laws were vital to that effort, providing
incentives for settling the land, establishing a successful agricultural system,
developing an economy, and expanding westward.360 Natural resources not only
represented significant challenges for survival, but also targets of economic
opportunity. Colonists resisted efforts by the Crown to transplant England’s feudal
system.361 Over time this resistance enabled the allocation function of property to
focus more directly on individual interests and to become a prominent driver of the
property-economic systems plane.362 These trends continued in the early statehood
period. Land distribution laws provided incentives for food production and
economic development (for example, by requiring settlement and planting of
crops) and promoted military and national security interests (for example, by

356.
See id. at 223–29; see also Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1387–91 (discussing
how the open-field system met the needs of villagers and lords).
357.
See BAKER, supra note 355, at 224–26, 229–33.
358.
Rules, for example, controlled the amount, nature and intensity of uses. See,
e.g., id. at 59, 264–65, 546–47 (discussing different laws developed to control uses and
prevent waste). Also, some fee simple ownership interests automatically terminated if a
condition was violated and reverted to the government-approved nobleman imposing the
condition. Further, feudal laws prevented free alienation of landed property interests, thus
ensuring control of the identity of the landowner who would be performing various
obligations for the Crown. See id. at 239, 253–54, 260–65.
359.
See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1388–91 (describing the open-field system).
360.
See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 52, at 245–46 (discussing how the
communal system initially used in Jamestown led to disaster and was replaced in 1619 by
the distribution of land rights); id. at 262–68 (discussing how land distribution laws were
used to encourage economic activity, westward expansion, and other purposes).
361.
See id. at 246–52.
362.
See id. § 8.1 (discussing the development of land distribution laws in the
Virginia colony and the tensions between colonists and the Crown). See generally HARRIS,
supra note 203, at 394–411 (discussing the contributions of the original colonies to the
development of general land policy).
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encouraging enlistment and insulating more urban areas from Native
Americans).363
During the revolutionary and early statehood periods, property also
became part of the fabric of the American political system. While some prominent
leaders proclaimed the protection of property to be the main goal of government,
many also appeared to view property as including a civic or social obligation. 364
Land distribution laws not only required certain conditions to be met before
conveyance could occur but also provided for uncompensated forfeiture for failure
to improve after conveyance.365 For a while, such forfeiture even appeared
consistent with the intent and scope of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
As one commentator explained, forfeiture generally was viewed as “a
comparatively extreme form of land use regulation” that was not subject to the
Takings Clause instead of as an actual government appropriation of land that
required compensation.366 Also, lawmakers in the early republic viewed land
grants as benefitting not only the private landowner but also the community or
general public.367 Over time, the practice of forfeiture stopped, and land
distribution became mainly about allocating interests in land.
Today, land distribution generally occurs through marketplace
transactions. This shift in transfer method parallels a greater emphasis on the
economic function of property and a rejection of the natural law basis of property
rights.368 The resulting explosion in land development has led to sprawling
development and a diminishing supply of developable land. Remarkably, as land
and natural resources have become scarcer, government has required greater
accountability from landowners, and some scholars have advanced the need for
reaffirmation of a social obligation theory of property. 369 Courts have reinterpreted
nuisance actions to allow recovery for certain forms of pollution, and localities
have adopted zoning and environmental laws to protect wetlands, coastal dunes,
flood-prone lands, historic properties, and even scenic views. 370 As governmental
363.
See, e.g., BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 52, at 268–79 (discussing
Virginia’s early statehood land distribution laws).
364.
See supra notes 51–60, 87–89 and accompanying text.
365.
See, e.g., BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 52, at 245–303 (discussing the
seating, cultivation, and other requirements of Virginia’s land distribution laws during the
colonial and early statehood periods); John Hart, Forfeiture of Unimproved Land in the
Early Republic, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 435, 435–39 (discussing forfeiture for
nonimprovement of conveyed land). See generally HARRIS, supra note 203 (discussing the
development of the land policy and laws in the United States).
366.
Hart, supra note 365, at 439.
367.
See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 52, at 274–77, § 8.3; Hart, supra note
365, at 437.
368.
See HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 31–53; Thomas, supra note 83, at 355–56.
369.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 95.
370.
See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 219–21
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing recovery in private nuisance but not trespass for airborne
pollutants); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826 (1939). See generally 1–2
NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY (discussing
environmental regulation of land use).
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entities have realized that the earth is now full, the property–nature relational plane
is being reconsidered in ways that implicate the civic or social obligation theory
and that involve greater government intervention.

IV. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE PROPERTY DIALECTIC
AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
To be effective, a property system needs to consider and account for the
complexities of a modern society. An effective property system must be able to
handle problems, challenges, and changing conditions—whether internal or
external. If the system is too rigid, too one-dimensional, too defined by a single
perspective, it will not have the ability to respond to future disruptions and
surprises. The system will not be open to the other perspectives needed to
understand a particular problem and the role of property rights in causing or
solving the problem; nor will it have the information needed to confront the nature
and scope of the real-life situation. Over the centuries the institution of property
has dealt with changing conditions, knowledge, and societal needs through the
dialectical process driving its consideration of issues, setting of priorities, and
defining of preferences. Though this process may not be sufficient to solve
complex problems, it is necessary. Common law property, in other words, has a
resilience that allows it to adapt, through formal and informal means, to
disturbances, disruptions, and changing conditions. The adaptation process may be
slow, but it adapts nonetheless.
One of the reasons why a multi-perspective approach to property rights is
needed is that the institution of property plays a vital role in the key systems of
complex societies. The institution of property—that is, the set or collection of
possible property arrangements—interacts with the other systems in complex ways
that are important to understanding the source of a problem or the nature of a
potential solution. A perspective that is too clear, too simple, too rigid will miss
those complexities formed by the systems’ relational planes. A property system
that does not have interdisciplinary inclusion will not be able to develop solutions
having interdisciplinary coherence. Rather, the thinking will be static and path
dependent on the assumptions, values, and choices embedded in a particular
perspective.
The mainstream economic perspective dominating property theory today
makes too many assumptions and choices that limit the pathways to understanding
problems and developing solutions. It ignores the full panoply of possible property
arrangements and the interactions with other perspectives even when those
arrangements or relational interactions better reflect real-life situations. To make
matters worse, the mainstream economic vision is being coupled with
constitutional protection of property, further locking in the assumptions, values,
and choices of the singular perspective. Serious challenges, like climate change,
that jeopardize the continued stability of complex societies will need a property
system that has interdisciplinary inclusion and coherence, realistic assessment of
ground conditions, and a broader view of the functions and goals of property.

